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JUSTICES SPELL OUT INSIDER TRADING; ANY MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION IS ILLEGAL, SUPREME COURT RULES
The Washington Post
Thursday, June 26, 1997
Brett D. Fromson, Washington Post Staff Writer
In the most significant securities fraud case in nearly
two decades, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
the government can bring insider trading cases against
people who profit on confidential information even if
they are not corporate insiders.
The high court settled 17 years of uncertainty about
the legal meaning of insider trading by defining it as
intentional buying or selling of securities for personal
gain using niisappropriated confidential information-
no matter where the information comes from.
"This is good news not just for individual investors
but also for companies, executives, their families and
friends, investment bankers, financial printers,
attorneys, accountants and consultants," said Joel
Seligman, dean of the University of Arizona College of
Law. "Now, if you deceive someone and trade in
securities based on inside information, you have a
reasonable basis for knowing that you have violated the
securities laws."
At a time when more Americans than ever are
invested in the stock market, the 6 to 3 ruling was a
huge win for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which is responsible for ensuring the
fairness of securities markets. There was much
apprehension at the agency that an unfavorable ruling
could limit its ability to prevent cheating in the stock
market.
The government had argued that it could deter insider
trading only if the court sustained the SEC's and the
Justice Department's legal authority to go after a broad
set of people who misuse confidential information.
In the past the SEC relied heavily on an expansive
interpretation of securities laws to nab such insider
traders as investment banker Dennis B. Levine,
arbitrageur Ivan Boesky and banker Martin Siegel in
the 1980s. They, in turn, led government attorneys to
junk-bond king Michael Milken, who eventually
admitted to six counts of false financial filing,
securities fraud and conspiracy.
Yesterday's Supreme Court decision overturned a
controversial decision last year by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 8th Circuit. The appellate court had
thrown out the 57-count conviction of a Minneapolis
lawyer accused of illicitly making $4.3 million by
trading Pillsbury stock on inside information about the
takeover of that company by British food conglomerate
Grand Metropolitan PLC.
The Minneapolis lawyer, James Herman O'Hagan,
was convicted on 17 counts of violating Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The appellate court said the law did not cover
O'Hagan because he did not work for Pillsbury or
obtain the information from representatives of the
company. Thus he had no fiduciary duty to Pillsbury
shareholders under Section 10(b), the court ruled.
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court said
that misappropriating and misusing inside information
were sufficient to constitute securities fraud. Section
10(b) makes it a crime to use "any . .. deceptive device
in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
In recent decades, the SEC has used the
"misappropriation" theory to bring nearly half of its
insider trading cases. In 1985, for example, the
commission successfully sued Wall Street Journal
reporter R Foster Winans for insider trading. The SEC
contended that Winans had a fiduciary duty to the
newspaper and violated that duty by misappropriating
information he had gathered in his work about
unannounced corporate mergers and acquisitions.
If the Supreme Court had not affirmed the
misappropriation theory, the commission would have
lost its main enforcement weapon against such trading.
In the past decade, nearly half of the 40 to 45 insider
trading cases brought by the SEC's enforcement
division each year have been based in part on this
legal theory.
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, said O'Hagan could be convicted of trading
on confidential company information because he
defrauded his law firm and its client, Grand
Metropolitan, when he learned of the planned bid for
Pillsbury and traded on that nonpublic information.
Bader said from the bench the intent of Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act was "to ensure honest markets,
269
thereby promoting investor confidence. It would make
scant sense to hold a lawyer-turned-trader like
O'Hagan a 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm
representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he
works for a law firm representing the bidder."
The government must, however, prove that a criminal
violation was "willful," she said.
The high court also reinstated criminal convictions
based on two other legal theories that had been rejected
by the 8th Circuit. In the first, the appellate court said
since O'Hagan had no fiduciary duty to Pillsbury
shareholders, the SEC overreached in accusing him of
violating a prohibition against insider trading on
takeovers.
The Supreme Court also reinstated mail fraud
convictions, which the appellate court had reversed
because it had found no securities violations. The
Justice Department had argued that the 20 counts of
mail fraud in the O'Hagan case should not be dropped
even if the securities-related convictions were.
"This decision reaffirms the SEC's efforts to make the
stock market fair to all people, whether you're a Wall
Street veteran or Main Street newcomer," SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt Jr. said. "This decision is a
reminder to all investors that insider trading is
cheating and will be vigorously prosecuted."
There was concern at the SEC that if it lost the
O'Hagan case, it would have to go to Congress for
legislation defining insider trading more broadly.
That would have been "a nightmare," according to
one senior SEC official, who feared that Congress
might not give the commission the authority it wanted.
INSIDER TRADING
Among notable cases of those prosecuted for profiting
from confidential information about a company they
did not work for:
1985: R Foster Winans, Wall Street Journal reporter,
sentenced to 18 months in prison for securities fraud
for his arrangement with two brokers at Kidder,
Peabody, in which he passed them advance
information about the timing and contents of his
column on the market.
1986: Ivan Boesky, who built a fortune trading in
stocks of takeover targets, sentenced to three years in
prison (served just over two) on a single criminal
charge related to illegal tips he received from Dennis
B. Levine, managing director of Drexel Burnham
Lambert; Boesky also agreed to pay $100 million in
penalties.
1987: Dennis B. Levine, managing director for
Drexel, sentenced to two years in prison and fined
$362,000 for using inside information about corporate
takeovers to make illegal stock-trading profits.
1992: Robert Willis, psychiatrist, sentenced to five
years' probation on criminal charges and fined
$150,000 for a stock trade he made based on
information he got from one of his patients, the wife of
financier Sanford Weill.
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post Co.
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TURNING TRADING INSIDE OUT
Ringing Endorsement of the Misappropriation Theory
Sets Stage for Wide-Ranging Prosecution of Insider Trading
Legal Times
Monday, July 14, 1997
William E. Donnelly and Thomas J. McGonigle
Three weeks ago, the Supreme Court apparently
resolved one of the most significant ongoing issues
under federal securities law. The question was whether
the "misappropriation theory" of insider trading
liability provides a valid basis for the imposition of
criminal liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lob-5 thereunder. In
United States v. O'Hagan, 65 U.S.L.W. 4650 (June 25,
1997), a six-justice majority held that the
misappropriation theory, properly defined, can support
a criminal conviction for insider trading.
Under the misappropriation theory, a person violates
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when he engages in
securities trading using confidential information
entrusted to him, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to
the source of the information. The misappropriation
theory thus differs from the "classical theory" of
insider trading liability, which imposes liability on
directors, officers, employees, or other agents of a
company-i.e., "insiders"--who trade in the company's
securities while in possession of material nonpublic
information.
The classical theory is premised on the idea that the
insider owes a fiduciary duty to the purchasers and
sellers of the company's stock either to disclose the
material nonpublic information or to refrain from
trading. By contrast, the misappropriation theory
reaches persons who are not insiders at the company
whose securities are traded--who, indeed, may be
complete strangers to the company--and thus who
cannot be said to have a fiduciary duty to its
shareholders.
United States v. O'Hagan concerned the purchase of
common stock and call options of the Pillsbury Co. by
James O'Hagan prior to the announcement of a tender
offer for Pillsbury common stock by Grand
Metropolitan, P.C. O'Hagan was a partner at Dorsey &
Whitney, a law firm retained by Grand Met in
connection with the tender offer. As noted in the
Court's opinion, "Both Grand Met and Dorsey &
Whitney took precautions to protect the confidentiality
of Grand Met's tender offer plans." Following the
public announcement of the offer, the price of Pillsbury
common stock rose dramatically, and O'Hagan sold his
common stock and call options at a profit of more than
$4.3 million.
An investigation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission into trading in Pillsbury common stock
and options prior to Grand Met's tender offer led to a
57-count indictment against O'Hagan, alleging
securities fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering.
The indictment alleged that O'Hagan had "defrauded
his law firm and its client, Grand Met, by using for his
own trading purposes material, nonpublic information
regarding Grand Met's planned tender offer."
O'Hagan was convicted by a jury on all 57 counts and
was sentenced to 41 months in prison. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed his conviction.
The 8th Circuit ruled that the misappropriation theory
could not support a finding of violation of Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The court also found that the
SEC had exceeded its statutory authority under the
Exchange Act in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a), which
prohibits trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information concerning a tender offer.
The 8th Circuit was the second federal appellate court
to find that the misappropriation theory was not a valid
basis for imposing insider trading liability. In 1995,
the 4th Circuit in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933,
reversed the securities fraud conviction of the former
director of the West Virginia lottery. The conviction
had been based upon his alleged misappropriation of
information, entrusted to him as lottery director, for
use in personal securities trading.
Since the 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits had all upheld
the validity of the misappropriation theory, the effect
of the 8th Circuit's decision in O'Hagan and the 4th
Circuit's decision in Bryan was to create a significant
split among the circuits. That produced the possibility
of disparate outcomes in insider trading prosecutions
involving fundamentally similar facts.
Risky Business
Under these circumstances, the decision of the SEC
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and the Department of Justice to seek certiorari in
O'Hagan was understandable, although not without
risk. For the past 20 years, the Supreme Court has
been generally unreceptive to many of the SEC's more
expansive, policy-oriented interpretations of the federal
securities laws. In particular, the Court has insisted
upon confining the scope of Section 10(b) within the
narrower limits that the Court concluded were
dictated by the language of the statute.
On the other hand, the SEC and the Justice
Department may well have concluded that the
particularly egregious facts in O'Hagan--millions of
dollars in profits derived from the misuse of
information entrusted to O'Hagan's law firm by a
client--diminished the risk of an adverse decision.
In any event, the wisdom of asking the Court to
decide O'Hagan was unquestionably vindicated by the
decision, which reversed the 8th Circuit in all material
respects. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the
decision could have been any more favorable for the
SEC's insider trading enforcement program.
The majority opinion in O'Hagan--written by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined in full by Justices
John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, and in
part by Justice Antonin Scalia--analyzed the validity of
the misappropriation theory with reference to two
essential elements of Section 10(b) liability: (1) the use
of a "deceptive device, " (2) "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security.
The Court found that the element of deception was
satisfied because the misappropriator "deceives" the
person who has entrusted the material nonpublic
information to him by failing to disclose his intention
to use that information for personal securities
trading--a use inconsistent with his fiduciary duty.
Thus, the Court reasoned, the misappropriation
theory is consistent with the Court's prior decision in
Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
In Santa Fe, the Court held that Section 10(b) does not
reach all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with
securities transactions, but rather only those involving
manipulation or deception.
Having concluded that misappropriation does
encompass deception, the Court then turned to the
more difficult question of whether such deception is
"in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.
The question was more difficult because, unlike
classical insider trading, the operative deception in a
misappropriation case is not practiced on the other
party to the securities transaction, but rather on the
person who has entrusted the material nonpublic
information to the misappropriator.
The Court held that " t his element is satisfied
because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information,
but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses
the information to purchase or sell securities."
Misinterpreted Language
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the
8th Circuit had misinterpreted language in prior
Supreme Court decisions that seemed to suggest that
Section 10(b) liability "is premised upon a duty to
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction" (emphasis
added). The Court noted that this language from
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), was
merely intended to indicate the absence of a "general
duty between all participants in market transactions to
forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information" and was not intended to suggest that "the
only relationship prompting liability for trading on
undisclosed information is the relationship between a
corporation's insiders and shareholders" (emphasis
added).
The Court also sought to clarify language in Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), which the 8d
Circuit had relied upon to support its finding that
Section 10(b) applies only to misstatements or
omissions made to a purchaser or seller of securities.
The language from Central Bank referred to liability
for misstatements or omissions "on which a purchaser
or seller of securities relies." The Court explained that
this language "sought only to clarify that secondary
actors, although not subject to aiding and abetting
liability, remain subject to primary liability under
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for certain conduct."
Having upheld the validity of the misappropriation
theory, the Court also considered whether the SEC had
exceeded its statutory authority under Section 14(e) of
the Exchange Act in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a). The
primary significance of Rule 14e-3(a), which applies
only to tender offers, is that the SEC is not required to
prove a breach of fiduciary duty in order to establish a
violation.
The Court concluded that Rule 14e-3 (a) is within the
SEC's rule-making authority under Section 14(e) "as a
means reasonably designed to prevent' fraudulent
trading on material, nonpublic information in the
tender offer context." But the Court declined the
government's invitation to interpret the SEC's
authority under Section 14(e) as broader than its
authority under Section 10(b).
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In an opinion joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part
and dissented in part from the majority opinion.
Thomas' dissent was based largely on the proposition
that the misappropriation of confidential information
followed by the use of that information in securities
trading is not analytically distinguishable from the
misappropriation of funds followed by the use of those
funds in securities trading. If, as the government
conceded at oral argument, the latter situation does not
give rise to Section 10(b) liability, then neither should
the former.
The majority responded to this contention by
asserting that Thomas' dissent missed the point, which
was "that a rule suitably applied to the fraudulent use
of certain kinds of information would be stretched
beyond reason were it applied to the fraudulent use of
money."
But the majority was forced to concede that the
government had overstated its argument in trying to
distinguish misappropriation of funds. The distinction
urged by the government was that confidential
information of the kind at issue derives its value only
from its utility in securities trading, whereas money
has utility in many other contexts. The Court corrected
the government: "Substitute ordinarily for only and the
Government is on the mark."
Easy Case'
The O'Hagan facts, involving information
misappropriated from an acquiring company,
presented the Court with the "easy case" for the
misappropriation theory. As the District Court pointed
out 13 years ago in SEC v. Musella, 478 F.Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), absent the misappropriation theory,
an individual who obtains nonpublic information
regarding a tender offer from the acquiring company,
rather than from the target company, is not subject to
liability if he capitalizes on this information by trading
in the target company's securities. The Musella court
found this distinction "troubling, " but "inescapable."
Indeed, the lack of any sound policy reason for this
distinction undoubtedly contributed to the Court's
willingness to "amend" the government's position in
O'Hagan in order to sustain the misappropriation
theory.
There is a longstanding debate about whether a
legislative solution is preferable to a judicial fix of a
statutory anomaly. In the case of Section 10(b), the
government has opted for the judicial approach--for
now. But O'Hagan may not be the last word.
Of course, the Court's ringing endorsement means
that the SEC and criminal authorities can, and
undoubtedly will, continue to pursue vigorously cases
based upon the misappropriation theory. Just as
certain, the cases brought will not be confined to
individuals like O'Hagan who obtain information from
the acquiring company. The misappropriation theory
has already been used to reach a newspaper columnist
who traded in advance of his column, a psychiatrist
who obtained information from his patient, and sons
who received information from fathers. We can expect
the SEC to stretch this theory as far as it possibly can
to capture any manner of trading that it considers
objectionable.
However, as the information at issue in future cases
strays further and further from the sort of the
information that derives its value "ordinarily" from its
utility in securities trading, we may well see the
Supreme Court obliged to revisit the misappropriation
theory--under circumstances that will make Justice
Thomas' dissent seem prescient.
William E. Donnelly and Thomas J. McGonigle are
partners specializing in securities law and SEC
enforcement in the D.C. office of McGuire, Woods,
Battle & Boothe.
Copyright 1997, Legal Times
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NONPROFITS GET INTERSTATE TRADE PROTECTION
The New York Times
Tuesday, May 20, 1997
Correction Appended
Linda Greenhouse
In a case watched closely by nonprofit organizations
around the country, the Supreme Court ruled today
that states offering favorable tax treatment to charities
cannot draw distinctions based on whether a charity
serves primarily in-state or out-of-state clients.
The Court declared unconstitutional a 40-year-old
Maine property tax law that made tax-exempt status
generally available to "benevolent and charitable
institutions" but withheld it from those "operated
principally for the benefit of persons who are not
residents of Maine."
By a vote of 5 to 4, the Court said the law amounted
to economic protectionism that placed an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The
law was challenged by a summer camp operated by the
Christian Science church that serves mostly children
from outside the state and, as a result, had to pay more
than $20,000 a year in local property taxes from which
it would have been exempt had most of its campers
been from Maine.
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens
said that a state law making a similar distinction
among profit-making businesses would unquestionably
violate the Constitution's commerce clause. "We see no
reason why the nonprofit character of an enterprise
should exclude it" from a similar analysis, Justice
Stevens said.
He added that "any categorical distinction" between
profit-making and nonprofit organizations was "wholly
illusory" given that "entities in both categories are
major participants in interstate markets." He noted that
the nonprofit sector accounts for approximately 7
percent of the gross national product and, as of 1990,
employed 9.3 million people.
Maine's law was evidently the only one of its kind in
the country, and the state did not defend it in the
Supreme Court. After a state trial court judge declared
the law unconstitutional in 1994, the state did not
appeal, and the case was carried on by the town of
Harrison, about 40 miles northwest of Portland, where
the camp that challenged the law,
Newfound/Owatonna, is located. The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court overturned the earlier decision and
upheld the law in a 1995 ruling.
But although, as Justice Stevens observed drily, "the
facts of this particular case, viewed in isolation, do not
appear to pose any threat to the health of the national
economy," the case galvanized an impressive array of
nonprofit organizations to make the Justices aware of
their concerns.
Groups representing universities, churches, the
United Way, the Y.M.C.A. and others warned of the
consequences if the Court permitted states to withhold
tax exemptions from nonprofits that serve a nationwide
audience. The Maine court's decision "poses a
substantial threat to the financial welfare of nonprofit
institutions generally," a brief from the American
Council on Education and other groups told the Court.
Their concern reflected the novelty, and therefore the
inherent unpredictability, of the issue. Despite a
formidable list of decisions examining, and for the
most part disallowing, economic protectionism by the
states, the Court had not previously applied these cases
in the nonprofit context.
Given the closeness of the vote, the nonprofit groups'
concerns proved well founded. The case, argued last
October just after the current term began, was the
oldest undecided case on the Court's calendar, making
it apparent that the Court was engaged in a major
battle over the outcome.
The majority opinion, Camps Newfound/Owatonna v.
Harrison, No. 94-1988, was joined by Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor, Anthony L. Kennedy, David H. Souter
and Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote
the principal dissenting opinion, which was signed by
the three other dissenters: Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.
Justice Scalia said Maine was not trying to regulate
interstate commerce. He said the challenged law "has
nothing to do with economic protectionism" but was
"designed merely to compensate or subsidize those
organizations" that contribute "benefits the state might
otherwise provide." As such, the law "survives even
our most demanding commerce-clause scrutiny,"
Justice Scalia said.
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Justice Scalia's opinion suggested, without quite
saying so directly, that Court precedents protecting
interstate commerce should not apply to nonprofit
groups.
A separate dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas,
which Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined but that Justice Ginsburg did not, went much
further, calling into question the Court's approach to
the commerce clause going back to the 19th century.
The clause itself, authorizing Congress to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states," does not place any explicit limitations on state
activity. The Court has interpreted the Constitution as
containing an implicit "dormant" or "negative"
commerce clause, as the precedents have labeled it,
under which states are greatly limited in the way they
can act, without Congress's approval, to regulate the
national economy.
This entire enterprise has been illegitimate, Justice
Thomas said. "The negative commerce clause has no
basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense
and has proved virtually unworkable in application,"
he said, adding that "we have used the clause to make
policy-laden judgments that we are ill-equipped and
arguably unauthorized to make."
Justice Thomas said another provision of the
Constitution, which prohibits states from taxing
imports or exports, should be invoked to prohibit
"certain of the more egregious state taxes on interstate
commerce." The Court interpreted that provision, in a
decision in 1869, as applying only to foreign trade.
Justice Thomas, joined in this portion of his opinion
only by Justice Scalia, said the 1869 decision should be
overruled.
Copyright 1997, The New York Times
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HIGH COURT REJECTS TAX ON NONPROFITS
The Justices Say Maine Can't Discriminate
Because an Agency Serves Mostly Out-of-State Residents
Portland Press Herald
Tuesday, May 20, 1997
John Richardson, Staff Writer
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday struck down a
40-year-old Maine tax law that was challenged by a
Harrison summer camp and nonprofit agencies around
the country.
The law allowed the town of Harrison to with hold tax
breaks from a nonprofit lakeside camp because the boys
and girls who go there each summer come mostly from
outside the state.
Supreme Court justices, in a 5-4 decision, said the
Maine law is unconstitutional because it discriminates
against nonprofits that serve residents from outside the
state. Nonprofits that serve mostly Maine citizens are
tax-exempt.
The decision delighted the directors of Camps
Newfound/Owatanna in Harrison, and spelled relief for
nonprofits nationwide.
Agencies such as the YMCA and United Way urged
the court to overturn the law and feared that, if the law
were upheld, other states might start collecting from
tax-exempt agencies that serve citizens of other states.
William Dale, a Portland lawyer who represents the
camp, said the ruling also is good news for a nonprofit
camp in Poland that feels it has been taxed unfairly
because it serves disabled youths from outside Maine.
Officials from Harrison defended the law, however.
Now the town will be deprived of one of its largest
taxpayers - representing a $25,000 annual payment.
The decision also could cost town taxpayers $100,000
or more in tax refunds and legal fees. Those costs will
now have to be determined by Maine courts.
"That's a significant chunk of change that all the others
in town will have to pick up," said Harrison Town
Manager Michael Thorne.
Townspeople have argued they shouldn't be forced to
subsidize a camp for out-of-state kids. "I expect there
will be some hard feelings for some people," Thorne
said.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. runs a 180-acre
summer camp for Christian Science children on
picturesque Long Lake. Although a nonprofit, the
80-year-old camp paid property taxes under Maine's
unusual law because the vast majority of the more than
250 campers who enroll each year were out-of-state
residents.
A revaluation in the late 1980s boosted tax bills around
Long Lake and prompted the camp to challenge the state
law in 1992.
Superior Court Justice Kermit V. Lipez struck down
the tax law as unconstitutional, but Harrison appealed
and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court unanimously
reversed Lipez and upheld the law.
The U.S. Supreme Court in March granted the camps'
request to review the ruling from Maine's highest court.
The Supreme Court accepts only about one in 75 cases.
A Maine case reaches the nine justices about once every
five years.
The national focus on Maine's law worried major
nonprofits, and many charitable groups supported the
Maine camp's challenge. They feared that other states
might tax their properties if the law were upheld.
A narrow majority of justices agreed with the camp
that the state's double standard is unfair and interferes
with interstate commerce.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the court that states
cannot favor in-state businesses over companies in other
states.
"We see no reason why the nonprofit character of an
enterprise should exclude it" from the same
constitutional demands, Stevens said.
"To countenance discrimination of the sort that
Maine's statute represents would invite significant
inroads on our national solidarity," he wrote.
Stevens was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter and Stephen G.
Breyer.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg dissented.
Writing for the four, Scalia said Maine is justified to
only give tax breaks to "property used to relieve the state
of its burden of caring for its residents."
When the case was argued in October, Scalia sided
with William Plouffe, the Portland lawyer who argued
on behalf of Harrison.
"Why should the taxpayers of Maine subsidize a
charity for people who live outside of Maine?" Scalia
asked.
Copyright 1997, Portland Press Herald
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HIGH COURT RULES AGAINST ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT
The Wall Street Journal
Thursday, June 26, 1997
Edward Felsenthal
In a decision that could increase pressure for a
legislative resolution of tobacco claims, the Supreme
Court made it harder for massive personal-injury
litigation to be resolved through comprehensive
court-approved settlements.
The high court's ruling wipes out a $1.3 billion deal
designed to settle hundreds of thousands of potential
personal-injury claims against a group of former
asbestos makers. The question before the court was
whether a diverse group of plaintiffs can settle such
cases, even if the same group wouldn't be allowed to
bring the case to trial as a class action. In class
actions, a few plaintiffs sue on behalf of a much
larger group, but the cases aren't supposed to be
approved for trial unless members of the class have
similar injuries or face common legal hurdles.
Even so, some judges in recent years have been
approving settlements of such disputes, partly on the
theory that the plaintiffs' mutual interest in resolving
the case overrides their dissimilarities. But yesterday,
in a 6-2 decision, the justices ruled that a common
interest in settlement isn't enough.
In an opinion for the court, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg said a "sprawling" case such as this one
can't be settled as a class action because the claims
alleged aren't similar enough and the people involved
have too many conflicting interests to be adequately
represented by the named plaintiffs.
The decision will make it harder to settle liability
claims in a wide variety of areas, including antitrust,
breast-implant and consumer-protection cases. It
would also make it more difficult to resolve litigation
against the tobacco industry if for any reason the
proposed legislative settlement of smokers' claims is
scuttled. That threat is likely to boost the incentive
for the industry and anti-tobacco forces to reach a
legislative solution.
The ruling means "there's only one clear channel of
resolution, and that's a legislative resolution," said
John Coffee, a law professor at Columbia University.
Indeed, several times in the opinion, Justice
Ginsburg seemed to invite Congress to intervene and
help compensate victims in such cases fairly and
efficiently. But she cautioned that judges can't take
matters in their own hands.
"Courts must be mindful that the rule as now
composed sets the requirements they are bound to
enforce," Justice Ginsburg wrote. Judges, she added,
"are not free to amend a rule" just to simplify the
management of complex liability cases. Class actions
are governed under a provision known as Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which lays out
a variety of requirements cases must meet in order to
be approved by a judge as a class action.
Dubbed "Georgine" after one of the plaintiffs, the
case was brought against 20 former asbestos makers,
including Amchem Products Inc., Armstrong World
Industries Inc., Union Carbide Corp., Pfizer Inc. and
U.S. Gypsum Co., a USG Corp. subsidiary. In 1993,
the parties reached a settlement that set up a fund for
class members who chose to participate in the deal
while allowing those who didn't to drop out and sue
on their own.
The agreement was supposed to resolve both current
and future asbestos-related claims. But the federal
appeals court in Philadelphia threw out the deal last
year, saying it couldn't "conceive of how any class of
this magnitude could be certified."
The Supreme Court's ruling reflects a similar
skepticism. Cautioning that the class-action rule must
be "applied with the interests of absent class members
in close view," the justices said the class-action rule
simply "cannot carry the large load" that the parties
"heaped upon it."
The Center for Claims Resolution, which represents
the former asbestos makers, said it was disappointed
with the ruling but would continue trying to work out
a deal that can pass legal muster. "The court didn't
rule against us on constitutional grounds, so I think
there is enough latitude for us to restructure our
particular settlement," said Larry Fitzpatrick, the
center's president.
Though the decision was a disappointment to
companies and plaintiffs' lawyers who endorse such
settlements, it may not be the last word on the
subject. The rule-making arm of the federal courts
has been considering a proposal that would make it
clear that judges have the authority to approve class
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actions for settlement purposes, even if the same
class couldn't be certified for trial.
Still, the court's opinion signaled that there may be
constitutional or procedural obstacles to an amended
rule that gives individual judges too much power to
approve nationwide settlements. Among other things,
the justices said they weren't certain whether there
was any adequate way to notify people whose rights
might be affected by a deal that is "so
amorphous."
Any rule that seeks to "transform a federal court
into a junior-varsity Congress" is certain to be
rejected by the court, said Harvard Law School
professor Laurence Tribe, who represented the
plaintiffs challenging the asbestos settlement.
Justices Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens
dissented from much of the court's ruling, saying
"the need for settlement in this mass tort case, with
hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, is greater than the
court's opinion suggests." Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor didn't participate in the case because she
owns stock in one of the companies involved.
(Amchem Products vs. Windsor)
Copyright C 1997, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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BANKRUPTCY IN LIEU OF SETTLEMENTS?
'AMCHEM' RULING SPARKS HOT DEBATE ON HARSH ALTERNATIVE
The National Law Journal
Monday, July 28, 1997
Bob Van Voris, National Law Journal Staff Reporter
THE SUPREME COURT's June 25 decision in the
Amchem asbestos case has prompted a sharp debate
over whether mass-tort class action settlements are
dead, dying or doing just fine.
While Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 96-270,
casts doubt on whether a company can cap future tort
liabilities with the stroke of a settlement pen, lawyers
are turning their attention to the Bankruptcy Code as
an alternative vehicle for evaluating claims and cutting
off liability.
For one thing, a group of nine lawyers, judges and
nonlawyer bankruptcy experts are about to recommend
changes to the Bankruptcy Code they say will make it
easier for bankruptcy courts to deal with mass-tort
liability.
This comes at a time when some say the door to
mass-tort class actions in the civil courts has been all
but losed by the Amchem ruling. In Amchem, the
high court affirmed a 3d U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals decision overturning what Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg called a "sprawling" settlement of current
and future asbestos exposure claims against 20
manufacturers. The Supreme Court held that federal
courts, when considering settlements, may not relax
the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which governs class action
certification.
Victor E. Schwartz, a defense lawyer with Crowell &
Moring L.L.P. in Washington, D.C., is one of those
who believes that Amchem demonstrates that Rule 23
is insufficient to carry the weight of most mass-tort
class settlements. "If one looks at the letter of Rule
23, there is nothing that says there are different rules
for settlement classes," he says.
As a result, he says, companies facing huge numbers
of tort claims "are looking once again, as
[Johns-]Manville, Dow Corning and A.H. Robins did,
to the bankruptcy courts."
Bankruptcy Under Review
The 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act set up the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission, directing it to
undertake a sweeping review of the Bankruptcy Code
and to report its recommendations to Congress. The
full committee report is due in October, although work
on many of the proposals, including recommendations
dealing with future mass-tort liability, has largely been
completed.
The proposal defines "mass future claims" for
purposes of Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11
reorganization plans, ensuring that potential future tort
claimants are represented and, to the extent possible,
compensated for their injuries. This means that the
claims may be fully discharged, preventing future
claimants from pursuing the company for damages
outside of bankruptcy court. In addition, the proposal
would recognize future claims in cases where a
company has been subject to numerous claims based on
pre-bankruptcy acts and is likely to face similar ones in
the future. The class that suffered the injury must be
reasonably identifiable, and the amount of potential
liability must be capable of estimation. This differs
from the current law, which is silent on the issue. As
Amchem demonstrated, the relationship between Rule
23 and mass torts has always been uneasy. Mass-tort
cases often have plaintiffs with various injuries,
different histories of exposure to the product and other
individual issues.
In addition, courts considering nationwide class
actions may have to contend with the tort laws of each
of the 50 states. And in cases where people have been
exposed to toxic substances, it may take decades for
their injuries to appear. Class members with current
injuries are motivated to get as much money as
possible immediately, while future claimants are best
served when a judgment or settlement provides that
money will be available years later when they become
ill.
Many commentators have faulted settlements like the
one ruled on in Amchem for selling out the interests
of future claimants. In the typical case, the company
wants to cap its liability and move on. And current
claimants want the pot for themselves. Future
claimants-people who do not even know their interests
are at stake-may get shortchanged, critics argue.
Settlement Shortcomings
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Members of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission have had to grapple with similar
problems. Commission member Judge Edith Hollan
Jones of the 5th Circuit is particularly concerned about
collusive class action settlements. "Everyone is so
concerned with making their money from managing
the cases," she says. "Nobody's taking on the ethical
responsibility to triage cases."
As a result, she says the commission is trying to
ensure the bankruptcy courts do not simply provide an
alternative forum for insiders to make deals at the
expense of injured people and future claimants.
Judge Jones has been insistent that the mass future
claims representative be put on the same footing as any
other creditor's representative. After considering
proposals that would have partially shielded these
representatives from liability, the working group is
proposing that they bear full fiduciary responsibility to
future plaintiffs.
Even with the proposed changes, few think the
Bankruptcy Code is a cure-all for tort cases that do not
fit into Rule 23. "You've got to realize that mass-tort
bankruptcy is very expensive," says Prof. John C.
Coffee Jr., of Columbia University School of Law.
"Most of the assets go to the creditors-as normally they
should in bankruptcy."
Proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code, he says,
"might make it possible for [bankruptcy] to produce as
unfair and impecunious settlements for the injured
victims as class actions were doing."
Despite the proposed changes, Judge Jones says
bankruptcy law remains a "flawed vehicle" for mass
torts. "There must be some better way to run the
show." And both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers
view bankruptcy court -- even a Chapter 11
reorganization -- with some dread.
"There are a host of practical considerations that
operate as a disincentive to resorting to bankruptcy
court," says Roger Trangsrud, associate dean of
George Washington University National Law Center.
For one, company managers are not usually eager to
give control to a bankruptcy trustee. And the company
may not survive the process.
After 'Amchem'
Plaintiffs' lawyer Ronald Motley, of Barnwell, S.C.'s
Ness Motley Loadholt Richardson & Poole, is not
eager to litigate in bankruptcy court, although he
recognizes it may happen more often in the wake of
Amchem. Mr. Motley was one of the lawyers who
negotiated the settlement that was eventually
invalidated by the Amchem decision.
"Bankruptcy court is the modern-day version of Bleak
House," he says, referring to Charles Dickens' novel
about a nightmarish, protracted lawsuit.
"I find the bankruptcy judges more inclined to protect
the debtor," he says. "Second, you're thrown in with
banks and other creditors, not [a tort plaintiff s] natural
allies. It's an unnatural thing for plaintiffs' lawyers to
have to do."
Copyright 1997 by The New York Law Publishing
Company
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96-1578 PHILLIPS V. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION
Use of interest on client trust funds to provide civil legal services to poor
litigants--Property interest cognizable under First and Fifth Amendments.
Ruling below (Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation, CA 5, 94 F.3d 996, 65 LW 2210):
Texas' mandatory Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts program constitutes taking in
violation of Fifth Amendment of interest earned on trust accounts maintained by lawyers
for their clients to extent that clients have not consented to IOLTA program's use of their
money; case is remanded to determine whether taking was against will of clients in
violation of Fifth Amendment, and compels support of speech that clients find offensive
in violation of First Amendment.
Question presented: Is interest earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in IOLTA
accounts property interest of client or lawyer, cognizable under First or Fifth Amendment,
despite fundamental precept of IOLTA that such funds, absent IOLTA program, could not
earn interest for client or lawyer--question on which courts of appeals are in conflict?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/4/97, by H. Robert Powell, Darrell E. Jordan, Brittan L.
Buchanan, David J. Schenck, Hughes & Luce LLP, and Nancy Trease, all of Austin,
Texas.
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HIGH COURT TO REVIEW IOLTA FUNDS
The National Law Journal
Monday, July 14, 1997
Marianne Lavelle
THE SUPREME COURT has agreed to review a
ruling that jeopardizes a major source of funding for
legal services for the poor-the program that makes use
of the interest earned on the small trust accounts that
lawyers hold for their clients. Phillips v. Washington
Legal Foundation, 96-1578.
In all 50 states, thanks to a program developed by the
American Bar Association, the $100 million a year
earned on such accounts is collected by state
government officials for legal-aid programs. But the
Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative
public-interest law firm, has long argued that the
so-called IOLTA program (Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts) violates the Constitution's prohibition on
taking of property without just compensation.
In recent years, the 11th and 1st U.S. Circuit Courts
of Appeals have considered-and rejected-that
argument. But last year, the 5th Circuit cleared the
way for the Washington Legal Foundation to launch
such a challenge against Texas' law. The 5th Circuit
did not reach the constitutional issue, but reversed a
district court's dismissal of the case. WLF v. Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 94 F.3d 996.
Members of the Texas Supreme Court, which runs
the program, have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
reverse the 5th Circuit ruling. They argue, as
proponents of IOLTA have argued for years, that the
amount of client funds in such accounts is nominal and
held for brief periods of time, typically as escrow in
real estate settlements. Because the costs of
maintaining such accounts exceeds the interest earned,
the deposit of a client's funds acts as an interest-free
loan to the bank. IOLTA, they say, is an attempt to
transfer this benefit from banks to legal providers for
the indigent.
The 5th Circuit questioned the basis of the program.
"The traditional rule that interest follows principal
must apply because that rule compensates the owners
of the principal for the use of their funds," the court
said. "If a bank customer chooses, however, to allow
the bank to profit in this manner, that decision does
not give the state carte blanche to claim that property
as its own."
The 5th Circuit said that to win its constitutional
argument, the Washington Legal Foundation would
have to prove the taking was against the will of the
property owner. The same would be necessary for
WLF's First Amendment claim, the court said. WLF
says the activities of IOLTA-funded activities, such as
legal aid to refugees seeking political asylum in the
United States and those organizations assisting
death-row inmates to challenge their death sentences,
force them to support speech they find offensive.
The American Bar Association had urged the
Supreme Court to hear the case.
"The ABA is convinced of the constitutionality of
IOLTA and is confident the court will uphold this very
important funding mechanism for legal services to the
poor and for the administration of justice," says
Beverly Groudine, counsel to the ABA Commission on
IOLTA.
At least one member of the Supreme Court will not be
listening to the IOLTA arguments for the first time.
Before his elevation to the high court, Justice Stephen
Breyer was a member of the three-judge 1st Circuit
panel that rejected WLF's case unanimously in 1993.
WLF v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962.
Copyright 1997 by The New York Publishing Company
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LEGAL SERVICES' STEAL FUNDING
ACTIVISTS SKIM INTEREST FROM COURT-RUN ACCOUNTS
Investor's Business Daily
Tuesday, October 15, 1996
David A. Price
Faced with federal cutbacks, legal activists on the left
are tapping into a powerful source of support - the
legal profession itself.
For more than two decades, say conservatives, the
federally funded Legal Services Corp., which gives
grants to local poverty law groups, has used tax dollars
to promote liberal causes in court.
President Reagan tried to shut it down and failed.
The GOP-controlled Congress was more successful at
curbing it by cutting funding and restricting its actions.
But the poverty law establishment was ready. It has
come up with innovative ways of getting funds without
going through legislatures.
These groups have tapped into huge sums of capital
that result from civil litigation, the opening of escrow
accounts and other legal transactions. Court-ordered
programs give these poverty law groups millions of
dollars in earnings from some bank accounts and from
unclaimed class-action settlements.
And they're using these funds to pursue their own
notions ofjustice and equity in state and federal courts.
Legal Services' typical cases include evictions,
foreclosures, divorces and child custody disputes. Of
the 1.6 million cases closed by LSC-backed attorneys
in 1995, one in every three was a family law case, and
a little more than one in every five was a housing
case.
But the third-largest category, at 15.7%, was
"income maintenance" -welfare and unemployment
cases.
These poverty lawyers maintain a docket that is
diverse and often controversial. The Washington-based
National Legal and Policy Center, a conservative
policy group, points to recent lawsuits in which legal
services lawyers have:
* Opposed the evictions of drug-dealing residents
from public housing in Macon, Ga., Pittsburgh,
Philadelphia and New York City.
* Opposed the deportation of aliens in Boston and
Atlanta who had been convicted of serious felonies.
* Helped drug addicts and alcoholics receive
disability benefits based on their addictions.
* Represented a group of homeless plaintiffs in
challenging a Santa Ana, Calif., ordinance that banned
camping on public property.
* Fought the adoption of Indian babies by
non-Indians in Illinois and Idaho.
* Represented prisoners in civil suits against prison
authorities.
* Sued to stop welfare reform in California, New
Jersey and Wisconsin, arguing the reforms were
unconstitutional or violated federal laws against
experimenting on human subjects.
The Republican Congress has been receptive to the
criticisms. It cut Legal Services' funding for fiscal
1996 by 30% to $278 million. The fiscal 1997 budget
increases slightly to $283 million.
But the new appropriation restricts the activities of
grant recipients. Recipients can no longer bring class
actions, challenge the legality of welfare reforms or
represent prisoners in civil suits. Lobbying limits were
also tightened.
These curbs, like past ones, have sent the groups
looking for alternatives.
Along with money from states and private
fund-raising, a surprising source of nonfederal funds
has emerged in the '80s and '90s: the interest on funds
that attorneys hold in trust for clients.
Where the amount involved is nominal, or where the
money is to be held for only a short time, attorneys in
a given state are required to pool money from multiple
clients into one bank account - and then the Interest on
Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) is doled out.
Defenders of such practices say they're not taking
anyone's money. Because the only trust funds affected
are ones that would generate small amounts of interest
individually - not enough to offset bank fees for an
individual account - the clients do not lose any
earnings, in their view.
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But trusts scholar Charles Rounds Jr., a law
professor at Suffolk University Law School and a critic
of IOLTA, disagrees. He said that it "seizes a property
right and diverts it."
Rounds added, "If the interest is public property - I
don't see how it could be - it belongs in the state
treasury to be appropriated."
And Rounds notes banks offer sweep accounts with
individual sub-accounts. That means clients could still
earn interest from a pooled account.
These programs give the money to legal services
groups - a total of $97.6 million in 1993. A 1992
survey found that such interest provided roughly
one-fourth of funding for such groups.
And to avoid new restrictions on grant recipients,
legal services groups have been spinning off parallel
outfits. Under such an arrangement, one group gets
federal funds and accepts the strings attached. The
other group operates with nonfederal funds, including
the trust fund interest, and avoids the strings.
The programs operate in every state but Indiana.
Many states began with voluntary programs, but
abandoned them when they didn't bring enough
money.
In 27 states, handing over the interest is now
mandatory. In 19 states and the District of Columbia,
lawyers must participate unless they ask to opt out.
Three states - New Mexico, Oklahoma and South
Dakota - still have voluntary programs.
In all but a handful of states, the programs were
adopted by the courts, not by elected officials.
The Washington Legal Foundation has sued the
Texas IOLTA program, which takes in around $5
million a year. The group argues the program is an
unconstitutional "taking" of property and that it
violates the First Amendment by forcing clients to pay
for speech that they oppose.
In Texas, says WLF, IOLTA-funded groups get
hundreds of thousands of dollars to represent illegal
aliens and death-row prisoners.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
New Orleans gave the foundation a partial victory last
month, rejecting the state's argument that the interest
taken by IOLTA never belonged to the clients. The
case is now back in federal district court.
Two other appeals courts have upheld the legality of
IOLTA.
Another little known source of support has been
unclaimed class-action proceeds.
When a defendant loses a class action suit, the
company usually has to set up a fund to cover the
award or settlement.
But because a class action may have been brought on
behalf of thousands or even millions of parties
nationwide, who may be unaware of the suit, much of
the money goes unclaimed. It is up to the judge to
decide where the unclaimed money will go.
Lately, judges have been giving sizable awards to
legal services groups.
In May, a federal district judge awarded the Atlanta
Legal Aid Society and Georgia Legal Services $1
million each out of a $4.2 million pie left over in a
class action brought against airlines for price-fixing.
Neither group had been involved in the litigation.
Atlanta Legal Aid executive director Steve Gottlieb
says he told the judge an award to legal services would
ultimately benefit the class members.
Gottlieb said the judge, Marvin H. Shoob, made the
award out of concern for the decline in federal funding.
"It clearly was a way of dealing with the national
cutbacks," Gottlieb said.
Gottlieb's group is investing its award and plans to
use the income to help offset the effects of LSC cuts.
Last December, a judge in Washington state
awarded $195,000 of class action funds to the Legal
Foundation of Washington and the Legal Aid for
Washington Fund, organizations that fund legal
services. That case had been brought against
Whirlpool Financial Corp. for overcharging on
interest.
And since 1994, California law has required that
unclaimed class action funds go to legal services unless
otherwise assigned.
A fund-raising manual published in August by the
American Bar Association for poverty law groups
advises that plaintiffs' attorneys "play critical roles in
helping a judge decide to whom residual funds should
be awarded."
It suggests the groups "work with plaintiffs'
attorneys involved in class action litigation to make
them aware of the opportunity to direct these funds to
support justice for the poor."
Copyright 1996, Investor 's Business Daily, Inc.
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WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
TEXAS EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUNDATION, Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 12, 1996
... WISDOM, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs-appellants appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and the court's
award of summary judgment to the defendants-appellees, in which the district court upheld the constitutionality
of the Texas statute, Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts Program (IOLTA), and found that the defendants are
entitled to limited immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the
judgment of the district court in part, VACATE and remand in part, and AFFIRM in part.
I.
Statement of Facts
Clients often give their attorneys money to be held in escrow, such as retainer fees or closing costs for a
transaction. In Texas, traditional ethical rules require attorneys to place this money in a trust account that permits
withdrawal on demand. The ethical rules also allow attorneys to aggregate all client funds into a single trust
account and prohibit attorneys from commingling their own money with the trust fund. Because federal law
prohibited banks from paying interest on demand accounts, these accounts formerly amounted to interest-free loans
to the banks.
In 1980, new banking regulations allowed negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, which operate as
interest-bearing checking accounts. NOW accounts created a vehicle for attorneys to pool client funds into an
interest- bearing trust account, provided that none of the funds belong to a for-profit corporation. Attorneys,
however, may not deduct the costs of maintaining the trust account from the interest earned, because such a practice
would constitute an impermissible benefit from the management of the trust account in violation of the ethical rules.
The creation of NOW accounts led to the development of IOLTA programs. The IOLTA concept arises from
the premise that there are still situations in which, because of the nominal amount of a client's funds to be held
or the brief period for which a client's funds will be held, NOW accounts are not feasible; the costs of maintaining
such accounts outweigh the interest that each client would have earned. In these situations, the trust accounts still
operated as interest-free loans to the banks. IOLTA is an attempt to switch this benefit from the banks to legal
providers for the indigent. Under its statutory power to regulate the state bar, the Texas Supreme Court created
its IOLTA program in 1984, which is modeled after IOLTA programs used in other states and which seeks to
capitalize on this banking anomaly. The IOLTA program originally permitted attorneys to place client funds that
were "nominal in amount" or were "reasonably anticipated to be held for a short period of time" into an
unsegregated interest-bearing bank account (IOLTA account), the interest of which is paid to the Texas Equal
Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF), a non-profit corporation created by the Texas Supreme Court. At that time,
Texas's IOLTA program was voluntary, meaning that an attorney could choose whether to participate but clients
had no choice, other than to select an attorney who did not maintain an IOLTA account.
The TEAJFs purpose is to manage and distribute the interest earned from the IOLTA accounts to non-profit
organizations that "have as a primary purpose the delivery of legal services to low income persons",with the
exception that no funds may be used to finance class action lawsuits or to lobby on behalf of a political candidate
or issue. Nearly all states have similar systems, which were designed to provide much-needed finances to legal
providers for the impoverished. States have drastically slashed the budgets for such programs over the years; in
1993, the Texas legislature even refused to enact a modest increase in court filing fees to compensate for temporary
IOLTA shortfalls.
Initially, the Texas IOLTA program did not meet expectations. Attorneys were reluctant to deposit their client
funds into IOLTA accounts and impoverished Texas citizens still were unable to obtain legal assistance because
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of a lack of resources. Texas's voluntary IOLTA program yielded only $1 million per year. Following the lead
of several other states and the recommendation of the American Bar Association, in 1988, the Texas Supreme Court
made attorney participation in the IOLTA program mandatory, requiring that attorneys deposit client funds in
IOLTA accounts under certain circumstances. The revised rules, which became effective in 1989, state that
[ain attorney ... receiving in the course of the practice of law ... client funds that are nominal in amount or are
reasonably anticipated to be held for a short period of time, shall establish and maintain a separate
interest-bearing demand account at a financial institution and shall deposit in the account all those client funds.
The rules further guide an attorney's decision as to whether funds are suitable for deposit in an IOLTA account,
stating that a client's funds may be deposited in an IOLTA account only if such funds, considered without regard
to funds of other clients which may be held by the attorney ..., could not reasonably be expected to earn interest
for the client or if the interest which might be earned on such funds is not likely to be sufficient to offset the cost
of establishing and maintaining the account, service charges, accounting costs and tax reporting costs which would
be incurred in attempting to obtain interest on such funds for the client.
Under the mandatory IOLTA program, Texas realized a dramatic increase in IOLTA revenue, with recent
earnings of approximately $10 million per year. The TEAJF distributes these funds to various non-profit
organizations who apply to the TEAJF for funding.
Procedural History
The plaintiffs' objections to the activities of some of the IOLTA fund recipients, such as those groups providing
legal aid to refugees seeking political asylum in the United States and those organizations assisting death row
inmates to challenge their death sentences, prompted them to bring this suit. The plaintiffs allege that the IOLTA
program constitutes an impermissible taking of property, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and that the program also forces them to support speech that they find offensive, in violation of the
First Amendment. The plaintiffs request compensation for the interest proceeds that the Texas IOLTA program
earned from their deposit and an injunction against the further application of the Texas IOLTA program.
The defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. Though the district court denied this
motion, it granted the defendants' subsequent motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' summary
judgment motion. The district court, finding the logic of the First and Eleventh Circuits "compelling", reasoned
that there was no property interest at stake in the interest proceeds earned on funds deposited in IOLTA accounts.
Having made this determination, the district court then dismissed the plaintiffs' First and Fifth Amendment
arguments. The district court concluded by holding that the TEAJF is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
against all of the plaintiffs' claims and that Newton is subject only to the plaintiffs' claims of injunctive and
prospective relief. The plaintiffs now appeal the district court's decision.
II.
It has been suggested that the IOLTA program represents a successful, modern-day attempt at alchemy. While
legends abound concerning the ancient, self-professed alchemists who worked tirelessly towards their goal of
changing ordinary metal into precious gold, modern society generally scoffs at this attempt to create "something
from nothing". The defendants in this case denounce such skepticism, declaring that they have unlocked the magic
that eluded the alchemists. The alchemists failed because the necessary ingredients for their magic did not exist
in historical times: the combination of attorney's client funds and anomalies in modern banking regulations.
According to the defendants' theory, the interest proceeds generated by Texas's IOLTA accounts exist solely because
of an anomaly in banking regulations and, until the creation of the IOLTA program, that interest belonged to no
one. The defendants then contend that Texas used the IOLTA program to stake a legitimate claim to these funds
and that the plaintiffs cannot now seek to repossess the fruits of this magic as their own. We, however, view the
IOLTA interest proceeds not as the fruit of alchemy, but as the fruit of the clients' principal deposits.
State law defines "property" and the United States Constitution protects private property from government
encroachment. Texas observes the traditional rule that "interest follows principal", which recognizes that interest
earned on a deposit of principal belongs to the owner of the principal. In the light of this rule, it seems obvious
that the interest earned in the IOLTA accounts is the property of the clients whose money is held in those accounts;
nevertheless, the district court adopted the theory espoused by the First and Eleventh Circuits, which circumvents
this rule. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs cannot "have a [cognizable] property interest in interest
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proceeds that, but for the IOLTA Program, would have never been generated". This reasoning, though, does not
give proper weight to Supreme Court precedent.
In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, the Supreme Court addressed a similar situation. The case arose
when the purchase of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies faltered because, at the closing, the purchaser learned that
Webb's had substantial debt that was not previously revealed. The purchaser then filed a complaint of interpleader
in Florida state court and tendered the $1.8 million purchase price to the clerk of court. Florida law required the
clerk to place the interpleaded funds into an interest-bearing account, to retain the interest earned for the court, and
to deduct statutorily-defined fees for maintaining the funds. During the following year while the matter was being
resolved, the interpleaded funds earned over $100,000 in interest. The court then appointed a receiver for Webb's,
who promptly demanded that the clerk deliver the funds to him. The clerk surrendered the funds, but withheld
approximately $10,000 for administrative fees and the $100,000 in interest that had accrued. The creditors then
filed suit in state court to recover the interest. Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court ruled against the creditors,
holding that there was no unconstitutional taking because money deposited with the clerk was public money,
interest earned on public money was not private property, and the statute only took that which it created. This
decision prompted the creditors to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court began by noting that the principal deposited with the clerk clearly constituted private
property under Florida law. The Court then determined that because the principal was "held only for the ultimate
benefit of Webb's creditors, not for the benefit of the court" and eventually would be distributed to them, state law
gave the creditors a property interest proportional to their share of the principal.
Having decided the ownership of the principal, the Court turned to the interest on the principal, "the fruit of
the fund's use" Reaching the opposite conclusion from that of the Florida Supreme Court, the Webb's Court held
that simply because the state ordered the placement of interpleaded funds into an interest-bearing account does not
mean that the state can assert ownership of that interest. Recognizing that "[tihe usual and general rule [under
Florida law] is that any interest on an interpleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated
to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal", the Court ruled that "earnings of a fund are incidents
of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property". The Court then concluded that
the Florida law perpetrated an unconstitutional taking of the interest, which is the property of the creditors who
own the principal.
After Webb's, numerous state courts debated the constitutionality of IOLTA programs. With the exception of
the Indiana Supreme Court, these courts agreed that Webb's was inapposite because of the difference in size
between the deposit in Webb's and the funds eligible for deposit in IOLTA accounts.
In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit considered the IOLTA issue in a suit challenging Florida's version of the IOLTA
program. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Webb's on the basis that Webb's involved the ownership of over
$100,000 in accrued interest, an amount that clearly exceeded any fees that were assessed. In contrast, the Florida
IOLTA program only concerned deposits that were so small or short-term that the administrative costs of
maintaining an interest-bearing NOW account for that deposit would exceed any interest earned. Relying on this
factual distinction, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Florida's IOLTA program does not commit an
unconstitutional taking, reasoning that the owner of principal has no legitimate expectation of earning interest on
money deposited into a Florida IOLTA account because "the use of [the client's] money had no net value, therefore
there could be no property interest for the state to appropriate". According to the Eleventh Circuit, the use of the
money had no net value because the IOLTA program only takes the interest from those deposits that do not produce
interest in excess of the administrative expenses incurred.
Although the Eleventh Circuit explicitly says otherwise, inherent in its Cone analysis is the notion that the
value of the alleged property involved determines whether there is a cognizable property interest. Under Cone, "
'property' is [erroneously] redefined as an interest that must necessarily benefit its owner". The Webb's decision,
however, creates a rule that is independent of the amount or value of interest at issue, holding that a property
interest existed in the accrued interest simply because "[t]he earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the
fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property". We see no reason why this rule does not apply to
the instant case.
The Cone court also failed to consider the precise events of the transaction, concluding that the only protectable
property interest in interest proceeds attaches to the amount of interest that remains after a bank deducts its charges
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from the interest earned, because the owner of the principal only has a legitimate expectation of receiving those
interest proceeds. It appears, however, that a bank pays interest on the account and then deducts fees. It is a
two-part process. As a result, a property interest attaches the moment that the interest accrues, from which the bank
then deducts its charges from the depositor's account Furthermore, the Webb's Court noted that Florida was under
no obligation to place the interpleaded funds into an interest-bearing account, but once it did so, then any interest
earned belongs to the depositor. The same rule applies to IOLTA accounts. Ethical rules historically demanded
that attorneys hold their clients' funds in trust accounts, choosing the type of account in accordance with the best
interests of the client. If attorneys still had this latitude, clients could not complain that a taking occurred when
the attorney placed their funds in a non-interest bearing account, because until the interest accrues, the clients have
no cognizable property right in the interest. The Texas IOLTA program, however, requires attorneys to place
certain client funds into an IOLTA account and then takes the interest that accrues for itself. In such a case, the
plain rule is that the interest proceeds, once they have accrued, belong to The Cone Court was correct to note that
the value of the property involved does not effect the determination of whether a property interest exists; indeed,
the Supreme Court rejected this position in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., in which the Court
held that "constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the
area permanently occupied." the owner of the principal.
The defendants additionally argue that finding a property interest in the IOLTA interest overlooks the fact that,
for practical banking reasons, the interest earned in trust accounts could never accrue to the clients. This argument
ignores one of the critical driving forces of IOLTA: IOLTA programs became possible only with the announcement
of Internal Revenue Service ruling 81-209. In this ruling, the I.R.S. agreed that clients would not be taxed on the
interest earned on their deposits in IOLTA accounts provided that they had no choice but to participate in the
program. By the terms of this ruling, if clients have any control over the interest generated from their nominal
and short-term deposits into IOLTA accounts, then the interest generated is taxable income. To prevent this
situation, Texas gave itself an IOLTA monopoly, reserving all the IOLTA interest proceeds for itself and requiring
all of its attorneys to participate in the program. If private charities were to establish private IOLTA programs and
clients could choose the program to which their funds went, then clients suddenly would have taxable income.
Applying the defendants' arguments to such a scenario, the IOLTA funds would be too minimal to return to the
clients, therefore falling outside of the Cone definition of property, yet clients still would have to pay income tax
on the interest earned, interest which Cone would say was not their property. This situation flies in the face of
reason.
We are also hesitant to declare that such interest is not property lest we incite a new gold rush, encouraging
government agencies to dissect banking regulations to discover other anomalies that lead to "unclaimed" interest.
One possible source is the interest earned by banks during the float time of checks. Consider a customer who
deposits a check drawn on a payor bank with a depositary bank. "In a simple case, where the Federal Reserve Bank
is the only intermediary, the depositary bank will present that check to the Fed and receive a [provisional] credit
in its reserve account." The Fed then presents the check to the payor bank, whose account is debited and the payor
bank must send notice of dishonor within the defined period or be liable for the amount. Typically, this process
takes one to two days, during which time the depositary bank has a provisional credit from the Federal Reserve in
the amount of the check. Until recently, depositary banks were not required to pay interest to their customers
during the time between the deposit of funds and the payor banks' deadline to send the notice of dishonor,
effectively giving the depositary banks an interest-free loan on the deposited funds during that time because the
depositary banks could treat the provisional credit like cash reserves. This interest-free loan appears very similar
to the one that the Texas Supreme Court sought to exploit with the IOLTA program and the interest earned on some
checking accounts conceivably could fall below any benefits received, creating an IOLTA-like situation. While
depositary banks now must pay interest on deposits from the time that they receive provisional credit from the Fed,
credit unions are exempt from this requirement and still receive the benefit of these "interest-free loans".
This is only one example of another "anomaly" in the banking industry and we cannot believe that such
anomalies each create funds that belong to nobody. The traditional rule that interest follows principal must apply
because that rule compensates the owners of the principal for the use of their funds. If a bank customer chooses,
however, to allow the bank to profit in this manner, that decision does not give the state carte blanche to claim that
property as its own. As technology continues to advance, the speed with which such transactions can occur will
continue to increase, providing greater opportunities for states to try to collect the fractions of pennies that could
be earned as interest during the float time of all these activities. Indeed, the faster the funds move, the more and
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more difficult it will be for individuals to make a practical claim to such funds. Nevertheless, the rule remains the
same: any interest that accrues belongs to the owner of the principal, unless they agree otherwise.
III.
The district court's decision on the merits is wholly premised on the notion that clients do not have a valid
property interest in the interest proceeds earned on funds in IOLTA accounts. Having rejected this premise, we
vacate the district court's award of summary judgment to the defendants and denial of summary judgment to the
plaintiffs. We remand this case for reconsideration in the light of the principles explained in this decision and for
further factual development of the record, such as the clarification of the types of account pooling permitted by the
TEAJF rules.
With respect to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, we note that to prevail on their taking claim, the plaintiffs
must demonstrate that the taking was against the will of the property owner. That or a similar showing would also
likely be necessary to prevail on their First Amendment claim. We express no opinion as to whether such a
showing has been, or can be, made in the context of this case. We leave these and such other issues as may surface
to be addressed in the first instance by the district court on remand.
IV.
Finally, the district court also granted the defendants' request for immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for monetary restitution. The parties now only dispute whether the district court
erred by declaring the defendants immune to the plaintiffs' restitution claim. The parties do not seriously challenge
this portion of the district court's ruling; the defendants concede that they are subject to the plaintiffs' prospective
injunction claims and the plaintiffs admit that their "principal concern all along has been in obtaining prospective
injunctive relief'. We suggest another reason for the parties' lackadaisical approach to this part of the decision:
they realize that the district court is correct.
The Eleventh Amendment shields states and their agencies from suits in federal court without the states'
consent. Initially, we note that the Texas Supreme Court is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This
immunity extends to the TEAJF because the Texas Supreme Court created the TEAJF pursuant to its rule-making
authority and the TEAJF acts on behalf of the Texas Supreme Court to carry out its role, which the Texas Supreme
Court defined. Similarly, defendant Newton is entitled to immunity because he is being sued in his official capacity
as chairman of the TEAJF, and therefore is also a state actor. The immunity that applies, as held by the district
court, is limited and protects the defendants only from the plaintiffs' claims for reimbursement because the Eleventh
Amendment does not protect the state from federal suits seeking injunctive relief. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court did not err on this issue.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred by holding that the clients do not have a
cognizable property interest in the interest proceeds that are earned on their deposit in IOLTA accounts. We
VACATE the district court's award of summary judgment for the defendants and denial of summary judgment
for the plaintiffs and REMAND for further consideration. Finally, we AFFIRM the limited immunity that the
district court granted to the defendants.
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96-871 STATE OIL CO. V. KHAN
Ruling below (CA 7, 93 F.3d 1358, 65 LW 2142):
Contract requiring retailer to rebate to wholesaler any profits derived from setting
retail price higher than wholesaler's suggested price is maximum price fixing that is per se
illegal under Section 1 of Sherman Act; district court abused its discretion when it
excluded retailer's expert evidence, which was study by qualified economist of same retail
operation over five-month period during which it was operated by receiver, without
claiming that study's methodology failed to satisfy professional norms; in absence of any
evidence by wholesaler, inference from retailer's study that retailer had been hurt by
maximum price provision was sufficiently plausible to defeat summary judgment for
wholesaler on issue of injury.
Questions presented: (1) Did court below err in holding that gasoline dealer, who was
limited to margin of 3.25 cents per gallon, was entitled to recover damages under Section
4 of Clayton Act, for losses he claimed from his inability to increase his profit by increasing
his price to consumers? (2) Did court below err in holding that agreement between
supplier, who was also landlord of property on which business was conducted, and dealer,
under which dealer's margin or markup was limited was per se violation of Sherman Act?
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COURT TO JUDGE PRICE-FIXING ARRANGEMENTS
The Associated Press
Tuesday, February 18, 1997
Richard Carelli
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court said Tuesday it will decide whether
wholesalers always violate federal antitrust law by limiting the prices retailers can
charge consumers for a product.
The justices said they will hear the appeal of an oil company being sued by an
Illinois gas station owner who wants to charge more per gallon than the oil company
will allow.
Barkat Khan runs a DuPage County service station where he sells gasoline and
related products supplied by State Oil Co. A contract between Khan and State Oil bars
him from pricing the gasoline, sold under the name Union '76, at more than a suggested
retail price.
State Oil, which owns the station and the land it's on, sells the gasoline to Khan at
3.25 cents a gallon under the suggested retail price.
Their contract requires Khan to rebate all profits he realizes from raising the price
without State Oil's permission above the suggested retail price, which changes from
time to time.
Khan sued State Oil, contending that the contractual arrangement amounted to
illegal price fixing - a violation of a key antitrust law, the Sherman Act.
A federal trial judge threw out Khan's lawsuit but the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals reinstated it in August.
The appeals court relied heavily on a 1968 Supreme Court decision in which the
justices ruled that a newspaper publisher violated federal antitrust law when it fixed a
ceiling at which its distributors could resell the newspaper to the public.
The high court said then that such price fixing was illegal automatically, or "per se."
In the appeal acted on Tuesday, lawyers for State Oil urged the justices to
reconsider the 1968 ruling.
The appeal argued that a "rule of reason" rather than a "per se" rule should be used
in judging whether such arrangements are anti-competitive and illegal.
The case is State Oil Co. vs. Khan, 96-871.
Copyright 1997. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved
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COURT TO CONSIDER RESALE PRICING CEILINGS, FLOORS
THE HIGH COURT COULD OVERTURN 'PER SE' LAW AGAINST MAXIMUM
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE.
The National Law Journal
Monday, March 31, 1997
Richard M. Steuer
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE-in which a
manufacturer and a dealer agree on the price at which
the dealer will resell a product-includes both minimums
and maximums. Recently, two matters have focused
attention on minimum resale price maintenance, in
which the manufacturer sets a floor for resale prices,
and maximum resale price maintenance, in which the
manufacturer sets a ceiling.
These matters, American Cyanamid and State Oil
v. Kian, foretell much about the direction the law will
be taking in this area.
On Jan. 30, the Federal Trade Commission entered
into a proposed consent agreement with American
Cyanamid Co. outlawing rebates that serve to impose
minimum resale price maintenance.
American Cyanamid sold agricultural chemicals to
dealers at wholesale prices that were exactly the same
as the prices it recommended to the dealers as
suggested retail prices. If the dealer resold the products
at or above the suggested retail prices, it qualified for a
substantial rebate which, in effect, became its profit
margin. If, on the other hand, the dealer resold at less
than the suggested retail price, it necessarily lost money
on the sale and was disqualified from receiving the
rebate.
The FTC charged that this amounted to an
agreement to fix resale prices-the agreement being
embodied in the rebate contract and the price-fixing
inherent in the fact that the rebate was an offer the
dealer really could not refuse. American Cyanamid,
which already had abandoned this program, decided to
settle rather than litigate. The proposed consent
agreement would prohibit American Cyanamid from
conditioning any rebate or other incentive on the price
at which a dealer resells or offers to resell its goods.
This matter presents a good example of how "law"
is being made in this area today without traditional case
law. Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek III dissented from
the commission's decision to accept the consent
agreement on the ground that evidence of a dealer's
conformity to a suggested resale price is insufficient to
establish an agreement to charge that price, and
therefore, that the challenged practice should not be
treated as illegal per se. This prompted three
commissioners-Chairman Robert Pitofsky and
commissioners Janet D. Steiger and Christine A.
Varney-to issue a responsive statement describing the
basis of their decision to accept the consent agreement.
Because this matter was concluded with a consent
agreement, there were no hearing, no findings of fact
and no administrative law judge decision.
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga filed a separate
statement urging the commission to include its
commentary in the consent order itself or not at all.
The majority relied on the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Khan v. State Oil Co. for the
proposition that, if a manufacturer enters into an
agreement confiscating all of a dealer's profit margin in
the event that the dealer departs from suggested resale
prices, such an arrangement amounts to a resale price
maintenance agreement and is illegal per se.
Khan involved maximum resale price maintenance,
while American Cyanamid involved minimum resale
price maintenance, but the commission concluded that
the same principle apply. As described below, the U.S.
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in
Khan.
The majority rejected Commissioner Starek's
contention that there had been no agreement,
emphasizing that "American Cyanamid entered into
written agreements which offered financial incentives
for adherence to a minimum price schedule."
Practical Effect
The practical effect of this proceeding is to reaffirm
that although a manufacturer still may refuse to
continue dealing with discounters under the Colgate
doctrine, it may not take the easier path of continuing
to deal with discounters while trying to discipline them
with some lesser punishment.
In this respect, American Cyanamid is consistent
with recent government resale price maintenance cases
against such companies as New Balance, Reebok, Keds
and Playmobil, all of which also ended in consent
decrees.
American Cyanamid extends that line of cases to
rebate forfeiture in particular, chipping away further at
the Colgate defense. It is interesting to note that
Chairman Pitofsky led an unsuccessful effort to
overturn Colgate completely in the 1980s, when he
served a term as an FTC commissioner.
The bottom line is this: Suggested resale prices are
not "suggested" when accompanied by an agreement
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under which the dealers cannot deviate from those
prices without forfeiting their entire profit. The
proposed consent order has been placed on the public
record and is subject to a 60-day public comment period
before it can become final.
Certiorari in the 'Khan' Case
On Feb. 18, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
State Oil Co. v. Khan, which involves resale price
ceilings. The outcome is likely to be the overturn of the
per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance
and, just possibly-though much less likely-the end of
the per se rule against all resale price maintenance.
In Khan, a petroleum supplier sold gasoline to a
dealer at a wholesale price determined by subtracting
3.25 cents from the suggested retail price that the
supplier set Theoretically, the dealer was free to resell
the gasoline at any price it chose, but if it sold at a price
higher than the suggested retail price, it was required
to rebate the excess to the supplier. Because the
dealer's volume presumably would decrease at the
higher price (assuming the validity of the laws of
supply and demand) and the dealer would not be
allowed to keep the increased margin per gallon
anyway, it would make no sense to exceed the
suggested retail price.
The 7th Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge
Richard A. Posner, determined that the supplier had, in
effect, engaged in maximum resale price maintenance,
a practice that had been declared per se unlawful by the
Supreme Court in Albrecht v. Herald Co.
Judge Posner did not stop there, however. Calling
Albrecht "wobbly" and "moth-eaten" at its foundations,
he wrote that the decision "was unsound when decided,
and is inconsistent with later decisions by the Supreme
Court. It should be overruled. Someday, we expect, it
will be."
In all likelihood, that day is coming soon because,
as Judge Posner pointed out, Albrecht is inconsistent
with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court's
later decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co. This case held that a competitor of a
dealer that is subject to a price ceiling stands to suffer
no antitrust injury as a result of having to compete
against the lower prices that the ceiling imposes on the
market.
But Judge Posner was not through. He seized the
occasion to point out that, although the Supreme Court
reconfirmed the per se rule against minimum resale
rice maintenance as recently as 1988, in Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., in his
view, that position is "not one that is easy to defend in
terms of economic theory or antitrust policy."
As Judge Posner put it, under modern economic
theory, "resale price maintenance does not impair any
interest that the antitrust laws.. .could be thought
intended to protect." He added, "The Court must think
that preventing intrabrand price competition harms an
interest protected by the antitrust laws even if the
restriction increases competition.. .and even if a
restriction that had similar effects but was not an
explicit regulation of price would be lawful."
Those "fightin' words" are as close to a formal
invitation as the Supreme Court is likely to get to
overrule the per se rule against all resale price
maintenance. If the court accepts the invitation, it may
use Khan as an opportunity to revisit the entire law of
resale price maintenance, both maximum and
minimum, but the betting is against it.
Justice Breyer's Dilemma?
Two last points about Khan: Although most
maximum resale price maintenance cases decided after
Albrecht found some way to distinguish that case, the
most prominent reaffirmation of Albrecht came in a l'
Circuit opinion written by then-Judge (now Justice)
Stephen G. Breyer, Caribe BMW Inc. v. Bayerische
Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft. It will be
interesting to see whether Justice Breyer adheres to the
same position or attributes it to stare decisis and takes
a fresh look at the issue. It would not be inconsistent
for him to reaffirm Caribe's recognition of the
anti-competitive effects of maximum resale price
maintenance but conclude that these effects more
appropriately should be dealt with under the rule of
reason.
The other point about Khan is that, because it
provided the foundation for the FTC's opinion in
American Cyanamid-at least with respect to the
definition of "agreement"-the Supreme Court's
resolution of Khan could have an impact on the
precedential value of that opinion.
Khan promises to be a notable decision no matter
how it turns out. If the Supreme Court does nothing
more than overturn the per se rule against maximum
resale price maintenance, the result will be to permit
manufacturers to cap the resale prices that their dealers
may charge, and this will have important implications
for many companies across America. If the court goes
further, the decision could be a certifiable bombshell.
The lesson to be drawn from these developments is
that manufacturers desiring to influence resale prices
soon may be able to install ceilings but should not
expect to put in floors. This will afford manufacturers
the ability to prevent price gouging by their dealers, but
not to prohibit discounting. The results should be in by
the end of the year.
Mr. Steuer is a partner and co-chair of the antitrust
group at New York's Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler L.L.P. and the author of a book and numerous
articles on antitrust topics.
Copyright 1997 by The New York Law Publishing
Company
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Barkat U. Khan and KHAN & Associates, Inc. Plaintiffs-Appellants
V.
STATE OILL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
93 F.3d 1358
Decided Aug. 29, 1996
POSNER, Chief Judge.
The plaintiffs operated a gas station in DuPage County, Illinois, under a contract with State Oil Company, a
distributor of gasoline and related products. The contract provided for the lease of the station (which State Oil
owned), and the supply of gasoline and ancillary products for resale, to Khan. Mr. Khan was the actual signatory
of the contract, rather than his corporation, which operated the station, so it does not appear that he is complaining
about a merely derivative injury to himself, in which event he would not be a proper party.
State Oil terminated the contract because Khan failed to pay the agreed-upon rent for the station. The
termination precipitated this suit, which, so far as relevant to the appeal, charges price fixing in violation of section
I of the Sherman Act, and breach of contract under the common law of Illinois. The district judge granted
summary judgment for the defendant on both claims. He ruled that the legality under the Sherman Act of the
alleged price fixing was to be tested by the rule of reason rather than by the per se rule, that the plaintiff had
presented no evidence on essential elements of a rule of reason case (such as market power), that the study
conducted by the plaintiffs' economic expert was inadmissible, and that without the study the plaintiffs could not
even prove injury.
The contract between State Oil and Khan provided that State Oil would establish a suggested retail price for
the gasoline (which was sold under the brand name "Union 76") and would sell the gasoline to Khan for 3.25 cents
less than that price. If Khan believed the price was too high he could ask State Oil to lower it and if State Oil
complied Khan would be entitled to purchase the gasoline from State Oil at the same margin, that is, at the new
price minus 3.25 cents. If State Oil refused to reduce the suggested retail price Khan could still charge a lower
price, but his margin would be smaller because he would not be getting a lower price from State Oil. If Khan
believed the suggested retail price was too low he could ask State Oil to raise it, thus preserving his margin; but
if State Oil refused and Khan went ahead and raised his price anyway, the contract required Khan to rebate the
difference between his new price and the suggested price times the number of gallons sold at the new price. The
contract thus required Khan to rebate the entire profit from raising his price without his supplier's permission above
the retail price suggested by the supplier.
The provision concerning the charging by Khan of a price below the suggested retail price neither is price fixing
nor is germane to the price-fixing charge. A supplier is under no obligation to lower his price to his customer just
because the customer wants to resell the supplier's product for less than the supplier has suggested without
sacrificing any of his profit margin. The contract in this case merely disclaims any such unusual obligation, and
since the obligation has no basis in antitrust law the disclaimer has no antitrust significance either.
State Oil also denies that the provision in the contract pertaining to Khan's charging a price above the suggested
retail price is a form of price fixing. It points out that Khan was free to charge as high a price as he wishes. This
is true in the sense that it would not have been a breach of contract for Khan to raise his price. But the contract
made it worthless for him to do so; and, realistically, this was just an alternative sanction to termination, and
probably an equally effective one. Generally when a seller raises his price, his volume falls; and if his profit on
each unit sold is frozen, the effect of his raising his price will be that he loses revenue: he will sell fewer units, at
the same profit per unit. The contract, incidentally, required Khan to buy all his gasoline from State Oil so he could
not merely switch to another brand if he wanted to charge a higher price.
Practices that have the same effect are not always treated the same in law. More precisely, two practices that
have one effect in common may differ in their other effects. A merger between competitors and a price-fixing
agreement between competitors has the same effect in extinguishing price competition between the parties, but the
merger is more likely to produce offsetting cost savings and it is therefore treated more leniently by the antitrust
laws. So the fact that State Oil's rebate scheme was as effective in deterring Khan from raising his price as a threat
to terminate his lease would have been does not dictate that the two practices be treated identically under the
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antitrust laws. But State Oil has not identified any other relevant difference between the two methods of preventing
a dealer from charging more than the suggested retail price. The purely formal character of the distinction that
it urges can be seen by imagining that the contract had forbidden Khan to exceed the suggested retail price and had
provided that if he violated the prohibition the sanction would be for him to remit any resulting profit to State Oil.
There is no practical difference between that form of words and permitting Khan to sell at a higher price but
providing that if he does so the profit belongs to State Oil.
So State Oil engaged in maximum price fixing; the next question is whether this practice is illegal per se,
meaning that all the plaintiff need prove to prevail is that the defendant engaged in the practice; investigation of
its actual economic effects is pretermitted. Challenged practices that do not fall within any of the per se categories
are subject to the broader-ranging inquiry into effect and motives that goes by the name of the "rule of reason" and
that requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct actually (or with a high likelihood) reduced
competition. Price fixing has long been illegal per se. In its usual and most pernicious form, the term refers to an
agreement or conspiracy between competing firms to fix a minimum price for their product. By a modest extension
it refers also to an agreement between competitors to fix either a minimum or a maximum price for the resale of
their product by their dealers. Why might competitors fix a minimum resale price? In order to make it more
difficult for any of them to engage in undetected violations of their agreement to fix their own (that is, the
wholesale) prices; a supplier who observed that he was losing sales because his competitor's dealers were selling
the competitor's product at a low price would know that the competitor was failing to enforce the price-fixing
agreement. Why might competitors fix a maximum resale price? The difference between what a supplier charges
his dealer and what the dealer charges the ultimate customer is, functionally, compensation to the dealer for
performing the resale service; so by agreeing on the resale prices of their goods competing sellers can reduce their
dealers' margin below the competitive price for the dealers' service. This is a form of monopsony pricing, which
is analytically the same as monopoly or cartel pricing and so treated by the law.
The questionable next step in the evolution of antitrust law was to affix the per se label to contracts in which
a single supplier, not acting in concert with any of its competitors, fixed its dealers' retail prices. Here the
economic difference between fixing a minimum resale price and fixing a maximum resale price becomes more
pronounced. A supplier acting unilaterally might fix a minimum resale price in order to induce his dealers to
furnish valuable point-of-sale services (trained salesmen, clean restrooms-- whatever) to customers, which they
could not afford to do without a guaranteed margin to cover the costs of the services, because the customers would
use the services provided by the full-service dealers but then purchase the product from a competing dealer who
could sell the product at a discount because he had not borne the expense of providing the services.
As for maximum resale price fixing, unless the supplier is a monopsonist he cannot squeeze his dealers' margins
below a competitive level; the attempt to do so would just drive the dealers into the arms of a competing supplier.
A supplier might, however, fix a maximum resale price in order to prevent his dealers from exploiting a monopoly
position. We do not know anything about the competitive environment in which Khan and State Oil
operate-which is why the district judge was right to conclude that if the rule of reason is applicable, Khan loses.
But suppose that State Oil, perhaps to encourage the dealer services that we mentioned, has spaced its dealers
sufficiently far apart to limit competition among them (or even given each of them an exclusive territory); and
suppose further that Union 76 is a sufficiently distinctive and popular brand to give the dealers in it at least a
modicum of monopoly power. Then State Oil might want to place a ceiling on the dealers' resale prices in order
to prevent them from exploiting that monopoly power fully. It would do this not out of disinterested malice, but
in its commercial self-interest. The higher the price at which gasoline is resold, the smaller the volume sold, and
so the lower the profit to the supplier if the higher profit per gallon at the higher price is being snared by the dealer.
Despite these points, the Supreme Court has thus far refused to reexamine the cases in which it has held that
resale price fixing is illegal per se regardless of the competitive position of the price fixer or whether the price fixed
is a floor or a ceiling. The key precedent so far as the present case is concerned is Albrecht v. Herald Company,
a damages suit like this where the Court held over a vigorous dissent that the action of a newspaper publisher in
fixing a ceiling at which its distributors could resell the newspaper to the public was illegal per se. State Oil seeks
to distinguish Albrecht by pointing out that the initiative for the newspaper to take action against the plaintiff
distributor had come from another distributor, giving the scheme a "horizontal" flavor. True, but this was not a
factor on which the Court relied. It stated its holding broadly: maximum price fixing is illegal per se even if
entirely "vertical," that is, even if the only parties in the picture are a single supplier and a single dealer, as in this
case. The Court explicitly rejected the view that "contracts between a single supplier and his many dealers to fix
maximum resale prices would not violate the Sherman Act." The only use the Court made of the involvement of
the other distributor was to show that it was not a case in which the supplier, had merely cut off a dealer for failing
to adhere to a suggested price. It is not cricket to distinguish a precedent by pointing to a fact mentioned by the
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court in the previous opinion but clearly given no weight by it. Otherwise no precedents would have any force, for
no two cases are exactly alike.
State Oil points out that a supplier has the right to suggest a retail price and terminate a dealer who does not
adhere to it. True, but irrelevant. In such a case there is no agreement between the parties and so no basis for
invoking section I of the Sherman Act, which is limited to contracts, combinations, and conspiracies, all of which
involve an element of agreement. There was an explicit agreement that Khan could not make money if he sold
above the suggested retail price. Had he raised its price above that level, State Oil would have had a contractual
right to a rebate.
State Oil's main argument is that Albrecht is no longer the view of the Supreme Court. State Oil relies on a line
of cases decided after Albrecht in which the Court established the concept of "antitrust injury." There is no right
to maintain a suit under the antitrust laws unless the defendant's conduct has impaired the kind of interest that the
antitrust laws were intended to protect. And there is no such interest in the maintenance of a monopoly price. If
typically and here a resale price ceiling imposed by a seller merely prevents his dealers from reaping monopoly
profits, the injury to the dealers from the ceiling-the loss, that is, of monopoly profits--will not support an antitrust
suit The requirement of proving antitrust injury is not waived in per se cases. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court held that a competitor of dealers prevented by their suppliers from raising their
prices could not complain that the restriction was preventing him from raising his own prices.
We have considerable sympathy with the argument that Albrecht is inconsistent with the cases that establish
the requirement of proving antitrust injury. In fact, we think the argument is right and that it may well portend
the doom of Albrecht In Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., we said we regarded the continued
validity of Albrecht as an open question, albeit for a different reason: that after Albrecht the Supreme Court had
(reversing its previous position) recognized that exclusive dealer territories may be procompetitive. As we pointed
out earlier in this opinion, and as one of the dissenting opinions in Albrecht had pointed out as well, a price ceiling
is a natural and procompetitive incident to a scheme of territorial exclusivity. The majority opinion in Albrecht
had rejected this argument on the ground that price fixing cannot be "justified because it blunts the pernicious
consequences of another distribution practice," namely exclusive territories. We now know that the consequences
of that other practice are not pernicious.
Yet despite all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations, Albrecht has not been expressly
overruled. And the Supreme Court has told the lower federal courts, in increasingly emphatic, even strident, terms,
not to anticipate an overruling of a decision by the Court; we are to leave the overruling to the Court itself.
Albrecht was unsound when decided, and is inconsistent with later decisions by the Supreme Court. It should be
overruled. Someday, we expect, it will be.
But all this is an aside. We have been told by our judicial superiors not to read the sibylline leaves of the U.S.
Reports for prophetic clues to overruling. It is not our place to overrule Albrecht; and Albrecht cannot fairly be
distinguished from this case.
It might be distinguishable if there were a class of cases in which maximum price fixing, though wholly vertical,
wholly unilateral, did cause antitrust injury, even if Albrecht and the present case were not members of that class.
Then, while Albrecht itself might be decided differently today, its principle that such price fixing is illegal per se
would have some domain of application. In that event affirmance here would construe Albrecht narrowly but not
abrogate it. But State Oil is not able to identify any cases, real or hypothetical, in which the practice condemned
in Albrecht could cause an injury to the interests protected by antitrust law. If proof of antitrust injury is required
in cases involving the sort of price fixing involved in Albrecht, no such case could be brought, whether by a private
plaintiff or by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.
More to the point, the Supreme Court's conception of antitrust injury may be broader than State Oil's. The
Court has never retreated from the proposition that vertical minimum price fixing (resale price maintenance) is
illegal per se. Yet, under the dealer-service theory that we sketched, and other theories that have the support of
antitrust economists, resale price maintenance does not impair any interest that the antitrust laws interpreted in
light of modem economics could be thought intended to protect. It increases rather than reduces competition--as
the Court recognized in the Sylvania decision, dealing with the closely related area of territorial and other nonprice
restrictions placed by suppliers on competition among their dealers. Yet Sylvania itself reaffirms the per se rule
against vertical price restrictions. The Court must think that preventing intrabrand price competition harms an
interest protected by the antitrust laws even if the restriction increases competition viewed as a process for
maximizing consumer welfare and even if a restriction that had similar effects but was not an explicit regulation
of price would be lawful. If this is what the Court believes--and it does appear to be the Court's current position,
though not one that is easy to defend in terms of economic theory or antitrust policy--the Court may also think that
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interfering with the freedom of a dealer to raise prices may cause antitrust injury. We suspect not, but we cannot
have sufficient confidence in our view to declare a decision of the Supreme Court that has not been expressly
overruled nevertheless defunct, as we would have to do in order to agree with the district court's ruling that the
maximum price provision in the contract between State Oil and Khan was not illegal per se. In Atlantic Richfield,
despite the Court's evident skepticism about the continued soundness of Albrecht, the Court distinguished it on the
ground that the dealers subject to a price ceiling imposed by their supplier, as distinct from their competitors, were
the intended beneficiaries of Albrecht. The implication is that the injury to a dealer like Khan from not being able
to raise his price because of a restriction imposed by his supplier is antitrust injury.
But even if Khan, as we believe, is not ruled out of court by the concept of antitrust injury, he had to prove
injury in fact to be able to maintain the suit. The only evidence of injury was in the report of his economic expert,
so if the judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the report we must affirm the dismissal of the antitrust
count even though we think he was wrong to think that Albrecht made it impossible for Khan to prove antitrust
injury. But we think it was an abuse of discretion.
The judge's ground for the exclusion was that "the report turns entirely on the experience of one receiver who
operated one gas station over a five-month period." Before Khan was terminated, State Oil issued a notice of
termination and, on the ground that Khan was selling inventory in which State Oil retained a security interest
without reimbursing State Oil, obtained from a state court an order appointing a receiver to operate the station.
He did so for five months. The plaintiffs' expert obtained the receiver's financial records and determined from the
cost and revenue figures in them that the receiver must have disregarded the price ceiling in the agreement wiL
State Oil. The figures showed that the receiver had realized a margin on his sales of gasoline in excess of 3.2'
cents. The only way he could have done this was by charging a price in excess of the suggested retail price ano
not rebating the higher margin generated by the higher price. The expert inferred that had Khan been allowed to
raise his price above the suggested retail price, he would have had a higher income, enabling him to pay his rent
and therefore avert termination.
Of course competitive conditions may have changed during the time the receiver was operating the station. A
dealer's ability to raise his price depends on the demand for his product; the demand for gasoline in general, or
for Union 76 relative to other brands, may have increased after the receiver took over. If so, his ability to maintain
a price higher than the suggested retail price would not prove that Khan had had a similar ability. And if Khan
could not have maintained a price above the suggested retail price, simply because competition would not have
permitted him to do so, then he wasn't hurt by the contractual provision of which he complains. There would be
a violation of the antitrust laws, but no injury.
But this is just to say that the evidence presented by the expert was not conclusive on the subject of injury--was,
indeed, very far from being conclusive. That did not make it either inadmissible or devoid of probative value. The
inference regarding the receiver's profit margin, drawn from the station's cost and revenue data, was
straightforward, and, so far as appears, was made in just the way that an economist interested in a firm's profit
margins for reasons unrelated to litigation would make it; and likewise the inference that if Khan had enjoyed the
freedom that the receiver evidently thought he had he would have charged a higher price, and made more money,
than he did.
The antitrust claim should not have been dismissed. We turn to the breach of contract claim. Although Khan's
primary complaint is that he was prevented from raising his price, he also complains that there were times when
he wanted to lower his price on nonpremium gasoline. As we said at the outset, this claim has no standing as an
antitrust claim. But State Oil concedes that its contract implicitly obligated it to suggest retail prices that were
realistic in light of competitive conditions facing Khan. The only evidence Khan presented concerning those
competitive conditions was evidence that on sixteen occasions during his operation of the station he had called
other dealers and been told that their retail prices were lower than the suggested retail prices fixed by State Oil.
This evidence falls far short of establishing a genuine issue of material fact concerning a breach of the contract.
There is no evidence that the dealers were actual competitors of Khan or that the prices charged by those dealers
were prices for the same grades of gasoline sold by Khan, which, remember, sold a gasoline that has a
well-recognized brand name. The evidence is perfectly consistent with an assumption that State Oil's suggested
retail prices were competitively realistic.
So the contract claim was rightly dismissed as a matter of contract law, but we note the absence from the record
of any indication of why the district judge, having dismissed the federal claims before trial, retained rather than,
as is the norm in such situations, relinquished jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claim. The presumption
in favor of relinquishment when all federal claims fall out before trial is rebuttable, but it should not be lightly
abandoned, as it is based on a legitimate and substantial concern with minimizing federal intrusion into areas of
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purely state law. Since the absence of merit of the supplemental claim in this case is clear as a matter of elementary
contractual interpretation, so that the retention of jurisdiction for purposes of dismissing the claim did not require
the district judge to speculate about the meaning of state law, we think the judge was right to retain jurisdiction
rather than visit upon the parties and the state courts the burden of further litigation. As we said in Brazinski,
citing a slew of earlier cases, if the correct disposition of the supplemental claim is so clear as a matter of state law
that it can be determined without a trial and without entanglement in difficult issues of state law, considerations
ofjudicial economy counsel retention and prompt decision, rather than remission to the state court. But we remind
the district courts of the presumption against retaining jurisdiction of supplemental state-law claims when the
federal claims are dismissed before trial, and of the concomitant importance of stating the ground on which the
court believes in a particular case that the presumption has been rebutted.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, as explained in the opinion, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, concurring: [OMITTEDI
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96-847 AT&T FAMILY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST CO.
First ruling below (First National Bank and Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Administration, CA DC, 988
F.2d 1272, 61 LW 2597):
Banks have competitive interest in ensuring that credit unions comply with federal regulatory limits and thus
have standing to sue to prevent violations of Federal Credit Union Act requirement that credit union membership
be confined to groups having common bond of occupation or association.
Second ruling below (First National Bank and Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Administration, CA DC,
90 F.3d 525, 65 LW 2106): Federal Credit Union Act's limitation of credit union membership to "groups having
a common bond of occupation" does not permit National Credit Union Administration's interpretation allowing
credit union members to be drawn from multiple unrelated groups, each with its own common bond.
Questions presented: (1) Did court below err in conferring prudential standing under its "suitable challenger"
test on banks to challenge NCUA's interpretation of FCUA, after acknowledging that interests Congress intended
to protect in statute were antithetical to interests of banks, contrary to Fourth Circuit's holding that banks did not
have such standing because they were not within "zone of interest" Congress intended to protect? (2) Did court
below err in invalidating NCUA's 1982 interpretation of FCUA's "common bond" provision, which permits federal
credit unions to consist of multiple unrelated employer groups?
96-843 NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO.
Ruling below (CA DC, 90 F.3d 525, 65 LW 2106):
Federal Credit Union Act's limitation of credit union membership to "groups having a common bond of
occupation" does not permit National Credit Union Administration's interpretation allowing credit union members
to be drawn from multiple unrelated groups, each with its own common bond; district court's dismissal of suit
challenging NCUA interpretation brought by several banks was reversed in earlier ruling on ground that banks'
"interests are sufficiently congruent with those of the intended beneficiaries that [they] are not more likely to
frustrate than to further the statutory objectives," 988 F.2d at 1275.
Questions presented: (1) Do banks, which court of appeals found not to be among intended beneficiaries of
FCUA, nonetheless fall within "zone of interests" of FCUA to have standing to challenge interpretation by NCUA
of FCUA's common bond requirement? (2) Has NCUA permissibly interpreted common bond provision to permit
membership in federal credit union to consist of multiple groups, so long as each group has its own common bond?
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HIGH COURT WILL HEAR CHALLENGE TO CREDIT UNIONS
The Washington Post
Tuesday, February 25, 1997
Joan Biskupic
In a case of great interest to consumers and to the
credit unions and banks that hold their money, the
Supreme Court agreed yesterday to decide who may
join federally chartered credit unions.
Credit unions, which are tax-exempt cooperatives
and subject to less regulation than banks, typically
offer customers lower fees and better interest rates.
And while their membership traditionally
encompassed limited groups of people in a workplace
or in a community, federal regulators in 1982 allowed
them to branch out, diversify their membership and
include groups from different employers.
Recent lower court rulings have, however, put new
restrictions on credit union membership. The federal
government, in urging the high court to take the case,
told the justices that the limits "threaten the survival"
of the nearly 3,600 credit unions serving 32 million
people across the country.
The justices will hear the closely watched case -
which will affect the financial services available to
millions of workers and the viability of credit unions as
a business - in the fall. A decision is likely by the
summer of 1998.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, Congress
passed the Federal Credit Union Act in 1934 to help
make money available for loans to people of limited
means. The act limited membership in a federal credit
union to "groups having a common bond of occupation
or association or to groups within a well-defined
neighborhood, community, or rural district."
In 1982, the National Credit Union Administration,
responding to massive company downsizing and a
changing financial picture for company credit unions,
adopted a policy permitting the establishment of credit
unions consisting of "multiple occupational
groups."The NCUA construed the statutory phrase
"groups having a common bond of occupation or
association," to allow more than one group to join
together in a single federal credit union as long as a
"common bond of occupation or association" existed
for all the members of each group.
That enabled weaker credit unions to be merged
into healthier ones. But as credit unions came to
encompass dozens of unrelated companies, banks felt
greater competition.
The case before the court began when the AT&T
Family Federal Credit Union in North Carolina began
serving customers not employed by AT&T Corp. Four
North Carolina banks and the American Bankers
Association sued the NCUA.
A federal district court ruled that the NCUA's
interpretation of the law was a reasonable reading of
an ambiguous statute. But the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit reversed that, saying the law
requires all occupational credit union members to have
an occupational bond and forecloses the possibility of
employees from an unaffiliated company from joining
another company's credit union.
The full effects of the lower court decisions have
been postponed because of the government's pending
appeal, and the courts have allowed credit unions to
continue signing up members from unrelated
companies already being served. However, the unions
cannot solicit new companies that have no "common
bond."
In its appeal, the NCUA asserts that its
interpretation of the statute is valid and says that the
lower court should have deferred to its view. The
federal government also challenged banks' legal
standing to sue over the credit union regulation.
Bank lawyers assert that if the NCUA's
interpretation is allowed to stand, anyone who has a
job with any employer could join the same credit
union. The consolidated cases are National Credit
Union Administration vs. First National Bank & Trust
Co. and AT&T Family Federal Credit Union vs. First
National Bank & Trust Co.
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post Co.
300
CREDIT UNIONS' MEMBERSHIP QUESTIONED
SUPREME COURT TO HEAR BANKING INDUSTRY LAWSUIT
AIMED AT LIMITING ENROLLMENT
The Dallas Morning News
Sunday, July 6, 1997
Richard A. Oppel, Jr, Austin Bureau
Like many small-business owners, Pete Mendoza
wants to make life a little easier for his employees. One
way, he figures, is affiliating with a credit union so his
workers have a cheaper option for banking services.
But he fears that might not be possible much longer
because the Supreme Court will hear arguments this
fall on a banking industry lawsuit that would sharply
limit who can join most credit unions.
It's an alarming prospect for many in small
business, says Mr. Mendoza, owner of a Dallas
ceramic tile firm. "They feel like something would be
taken away from them."
After years in the making, an epic fight is coming
to a head between the nation's banking industry and
the credit unions that serve almost 70 million people.
For consumers, the outcome may be the most
significant development in the banking industry in
years, experts say.
At issue are the rules about who can join most
credit unions, which have surged in popularity because
they offer cheaper loans and more generous savings
account interest rates than banks.
But consumer advocates say the court battle, and
action in Congress that could follow, may have even
broader implications. It could open up the question of
whether millions of people who have joined credit
unions since 1982 might have to find somewhere else
to bank. And, they say, anything that weakens credit
unions could reduce competition against banks and
hurt all borrowers.
"This case matters not just to those who may have
the opportunity to join a credit union, but also to all
consumers served by the for-profit institutions as well,"
said Stephen Brobeck, executive director of the
Consumer Federation of America in Washington, D.C.
Bankers argue that it's unfair for credit unions to be
allowed to sign up almost anybody as members - as
some do now - but still not have to pay federal taxes.
Credit unions and consumer advocates contend that
banks, despite being very profitable, are simply trying
to hobble scrappy competitors and lessen options for
consumers.
After action by a number of states, Congress
approved legislation in 1934 to create federally
chartered credit unions. It permitted groups of people
sharing a"common bond" to form tax-exempt credit
unions, pooling their money and borrowing against it
on favorable terms. They became fixtures at factories,
school districts, military bases and other workplaces
that employed many people in similar jobs.
But many credit unions found themselves squeezed
in the economic downturn of the early 1980s. As large
companies laid off thousands of workers at a time,
some saw big portions of their memberships thrown
out of work, imperiling their solvency. In 1981 alone,
222 federal credit unions failed.
The next year, the federal agency that regulates
most credit unions stepped in with a solution: They
could merge their memberships. That would allow,
say, a credit union at a military base to sign up
employees of certain nearby companies. By 1983, the
number of credit union failures had dropped to just 40.
Meanwhile, the rule change also gave them leeway
to expand rapidly, allowing the most aggressive to take
an ever-growing piece of business away from banks.
Growing presence
In some towns, credit unions now have more than
20 percent of all deposits. Their tax-exempt status
allows them to undercut banks on loans and pay out
more on savings accounts, banking industry officials
say, and they have weakened a number of community
banks.
"Dadgununit, it's tough," says Ed Lette, president
of Security National Bank in San Antonio, a
community bank with $165 million in assets.
Ten years ago, 90 percent of the bank's business
was consumer loans. Today it's only 9 percent, mostly
because of credit union competition, Mr. Lette says.
Small-business owners ought to be concerned about
credit unions' increasing clout, he says, because the
fierce competition has driven weaker banks to merge
and will continue to speed industry consolidation. Over
time, that means small-business borrowers will have
fewer options.
"I'm not saying that we, as a bank, have suffered,
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but our community has suffered," Mr. Lette says."If
they're going to be like banks and have branches all
over the place, they should pay income taxes, or they
should go back to their 'common bond.' That's all I ask
for."
John Heasley, general counsel of the Texas Bankers
Association, acknowledges that many banks are
currently quite profitable, many at record levels. But,
he says,"If you look at trends of encroachment into the
auto loan market, bankers can look down the line and
see a potential threat to their viability."
Credit union officials contend the banks are simply
being greedy, upset that a small portion of their overall
business has been taken away.
"We think banks would like to eliminate credit
unions as competition," says Kenneth Sorrels,
president of Dallas Teachers Credit Union."Credit
unions have typically been more consumer-friendly.
We don't have stockholders who demand we make as
much profit as we possibly can."
Jack Byno, vice president for operations of the
American Airlines Employees Federal Credit Union,
says bankers' arguments about"fairness" are cover to
strip credit unions of whatever they can.
"They just play whatever card is best-received at
that point in time," says Mr. Byno, whose credit union
is the nation's third largest. He predicts that the banks
will push legislation to strip credit unions of federal
tax-exempt status"no matter if they win or lose" the
membership lawsuit before the Supreme Court.
The case stems from a 1990 lawsuit filed by a
group of North Carolina banks, which alleged that the
AT&T Family Federal Credit Union was violating
federal law. The credit union was created for Ma Bell
employees but signed up tens of thousands of other
members after the 1982 rule change.
Bank response
Joined by the American Bankers Association, the
banks want the high court to forbid credit unions from
signing up members outside the credit
union's"common bond." For instance, a credit union
set up to serve educators could only serve teachers,
administrators and other school workers, as well as
their families.
Earlier, an appeals court sided with the banks but
later allowed credit unions to temporarily continue
enrolling members from groups already affiliated with
them. New employer groups still can't join federal
credit unions, however.
The case could immediately affect about 15 million
members of federal credit unions who don't fall under
their institutions' original common bond, according to
the National Credit Union Administration, the federal
agency that regulates the industry.
Experts say the case isn't likely to directly affect
thousands of other credit unions organized under state
charters. But if the banks succeed in court, credit union
officials expect the industry to go after state-chartered
credit unions quickly.
"Once something happens with the federal charters,
it's only a matter of time before similar lawsuits affect
state charters," says Mr. Sorrels of the state-chartered
Dallas Teachers Credit Union.
Barring any court action, credit unions expect to
continue growing rapidly. In the last decade,
membership has jumped to nearly 70 million from 50
million. Total assets have doubled to more than $300
million.
The success isn't hard to figure. Credit unions
generally pay higher interest rates on deposits, provide
auto and consumer loans at cheaper interest rates, and
often have fewer service fees than banks.
According to a study last year by the Consumer
Federation of America, consumers could save $8
billion annually by shifting their bank credit card
balances to credit union cards with lower interest rates.
The study also found that credit unions charge much
less for a number of services - an average of $9.10 for
a stop-payment order on a check, for example,
compared with $14.41 at a bank.
Service offerings
Credit unions have made new inroads using more
sophisticated products, such as setting up individual
retirement accounts. But they have become particularly
competitive on car loans, establishing extensive
financing arrangements with networks of dealers.
Matt Doyle, chief executive of Texas First Bank in
Galveston, says one of his credit union competitors
recently offered car buyers the chance to pick their
interest rate by pulling a slip of paper from a
fishbowl."The lowest rate may be zero; the highest
may be 7 percent]. How are you going to compete with
that?" he asks.
Many members say credit unions simply offer
better service."You can call up one person you know"
to get a loan, says Billy Smith, a researcher at the
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at
Dallas who uses a credit union serving employees at
Atlantic Richfield Co., where he used to work."With a
bank, you have to talk to six people you've never heard
of."
Maximo Lacayo, a maintenance worker in the
Dallas Independent School District, says he has had
trouble borrowing from banks in the past but is now
happy as a member of the Dallas Teachers Credit
Union."Banks put too many conditions on lending
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money."
Not all agree, however. Chuck Pickett, who owns
a barber shop in White Settlement, says he tried
banking at nearby Omni American Federal Credit
Union. It is the former Carswell Air Force Base credit
union, which diversified its membership as the base
and nearby Lockheed Martin Corp. plant endured
thousands of layoffs.
In search of friendlier service, he later switched to
a nearby bank. At the credit union,"You'd get the
attitude that you're here for us; we're not here for you."
Role of Congress
Few experts believe the fight will stop at the
Supreme Court. A decision in the case, which is
expected by next spring, might be just the first step in
an odyssey that will move to Congress and state courts
and legislatures across the nation.
"Regardless of how the Supreme Court decides, this
is going to land squarely in the halls of Congress," says
Chris Williston, president of the Independent Bankers
Association of Texas, which represents community
banks.
One bill pending in the House would give federal
credit unions unquestioned authority to enroll people
from numerous different businesses, industries or other
groups. No substantial action is likely until after the
Supreme Court ruling, industry officials say.
Although banks have more money, credit unions
are a powerful political force because of the size of
their membership, support from consumer groups and
significant backing among lawmakers.
Anticipating upcoming legislative battles, they
have blanketed members with literature. At Dallas
Teachers Credit Union, members are offered a
brochure with a picture of a noose and the comment
nearby that"bankers want to strangle credit unions."
If the Supreme Court sides with the banks, lower
courts will have to decide an even pricklier question:
Do credit unions simply stop accepting new members
who don't qualify? Or should they be forced to
disenroll millions of members who have joined in
recent years but don't meet the new common bond
standard?
Banks would likely push for "some type of
grandfathering" for existing members, though that still
could force some disenrollments, says Mr. Heasley of
the Texas Bankers Association. If banks seek too
much, he allows, they"could risk a political backlash."
Dean Borland, vice president for business
development at the state-chartered Texins Credit
Union, which primarily serves current and former
Texas Instruments Inc. employees but has other
members, says he doesn't fear widespread
disenrollment."I just can't believe Congress would
allow that to happen," he says.
If the banks prevail, many federally chartered
credit unions also could obtain state charters. That
would allow them to seek more favorable treatment
from state lawmakers and judges.
But Mr. Brobeck, the consumer advocate, predicts
there is too much sentiment in favor of the credit
unions to see them severely harmed. "Ultimately,
credit unions will prevail because the public will
support them," he says.
Copyright 1997, The Dallas Morning News
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellants,
V.
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION, et al.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
et al., Lexington State Bank, Appellants,
V.
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION
988 F.2d 1272
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided April 2, 1993.
... SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, four North Carolina banks and the American Bankers Association, challenged the National Credit
Union Administration's (NCUA) approval of several recent applications by AT & T Family Federal Credit Union
(AT & T Family) to expand its membership. According to appellants, the NCUA's decisions violated the
requirement of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) that membership in federal credit unions be limited to
"groups having a common bond of occupation or association." The banks complain that, by allowing AT & T
Family improperly to extend its membership and thereby its number of potential borrowing customers, the NCUA
has made the credit union a formidable competitor. The district court applied the "zone of interests" tests for
prudential standing and determined that appellants lacked standing to sue. Although we agree with the district
court that the appellants were not intended beneficiaries of the FCUA, we think that they are suitable challengers
because the statute arguably prohibits the competition of which they complain. This case thus falls within the
rationale of Clarke v. Securities Industry Association and Investment Company Institute v. Camp. We reverse and
remand to the district court.
I.
Passed in 1934 in the midst of the Great Depression, the FCUA, was designed to improve access to credit for
people of "small means. For many working Americans, credit at reasonable rates had essentially disappeared in
the years following the stock market crash. Lacking the security necessary to obtain loans from banks, working
Americans turned to loan sharks who typically charged usurious interest rates, which was thought to reduce the
overall purchasing power of American consumers. Congress saw the solution to this problem in a system of federal
credit unions that would provide credit at reasonable rates and thus would help spur economic recovery. To ensure
that credit unions fulfilled their purpose of meeting members' credit needs, Congress restricted credit unions'
management and business activities. For example, a federal credit union is owned and controlled by its members,
and it can make loans only to members or to other credit unions. Congress expected that such measures
guaranteeing democratic self-government would infuse the credit union with a spirit of cooperative self-help and
ensure that the credit union would remain responsive to its members' needs.
A related provision of the FCUA, the common bond requirement, is at the heart of this case. Section 109 of
the Act restricts membership in federal credit unions to "groups having a common bond of occupation or
association." For much of the Act's history, the NCUA interpreted this provision to require all members of a credit
union to share the same bond. In the 1980s, however, the NCUA issued a series of Interpretive Ruling and Policy
Statements (IRPS) construing the statute to allow a number of different groups, each having its own bond, to form
a credit union, even though no overall common bond united the different groups. The NCUA's most recent
interpretation, made clear that a credit union could comprise a "combination of distinct, definable occupational
and/or associational groups."
Appellants challenged several decisions in which the NCUA applied IRPS 89-1 to approve applications by AT
& T Family to expand its field of membership. Until recently, AT & T Family's membership consisted primarily
of employees of AT & T Technologies, Inc., AT & T Network Systems, and Bell Telephone Labs. In late 1989 and
1990, AT & T Family filed eight applications to extend its membership to include groups of employees from other
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companies such as the American Tobacco Company, Western Auto Supply Company, and WGHP-TV, to name but
a few. In all, the NCUA approved the extension of AT & T Family's membership to 16 new employee groups.
Appellants claimed before the agency and in the district court that IRPS 89-1 ignored the statutory language by
allowing groups lacking any common bond between them to join together in a credit union. The banks contended
that by allowing AT & T Family to expand to 71,000 members in violation of the statute, the NCUA has allowed
the credit union, which is exempt from state and federal income taxes, to become a formidable competitor to banks.
The district court granted NCUA's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The court determined that appellants
were not pressing claims "arguably within the zone of interests" protected by the FCUA. Relying on the language
of this court's post-Clarke decisions on prudential standing, the district court said that "[t]hose not regulated by an
agency have standing only if they are the intended beneficiaries of the specific statute or are nonetheless 'suitable
challengers' to the statute because their interests coincide with the interests which Congress did intend to protect."
The banks were not intended beneficiaries of the Act, thought the district court, because "the Act was passed
to establish a place for credit unions within the country's financial market, and specifically not to protect the
competitive interest of banks." Under applicable precedent, the district court believed that the banks were not
suitable challengers either. Because the banks and the credit union competed for the same business, any coincidence
in their interests "would be at best fortuitous." The banks, according to the district court, could not rely on the
Supreme Court's cases that granted standing to competitors as suitable challengers because, unlike the competitors
in those cases, the banks were not suing under an entry-restricting statute.
II.
It should be noted that no one questions appellants' Article III standing; that appellants will suffer competitive
or economic injury is not in doubt. The question before us is whether under the FCUA the banks can claim
prudential standing as well. In other words, are they pursuing an interest (not just an objective), arguably within
the zone of interests Congress intended either to regulate or protect, and, thus, are they among the class of persons
entitled to sue to enforce FCUA's restrictions? This "zone of interests" test ensures that standing is granted only
to plaintiffs who will not distort congressional objectives. It excludes those plaintiffs whose "interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that Congress intended to permit the suit" Because the banks are not regulated by the common bond requirement,
we must inquire whether the banks can be thought to have been "protected" by that statutory limitation on the
activities of credit unions. Litigants can qualify as "protected" by a statute if they are intended beneficiaries of the
legislation or are nevertheless what we have termed suitable challengers; that is, if their interests are sufficiently
congruent with those of the intended beneficiaries that the litigants are not "more likely to frustrate than to further
the statutory objectives."
Appellants claim that they qualify both as intended beneficiaries and as suitable challengers under the FCUA.
We agree with the district court, however, that Congress did not, in 1934, intend to shield banks from competition
from credit unions. Indeed, the very notion seems anomalous, because Congress' general purpose was to encourage
the proliferation of credit unions, which were expected to provide service to those would-be customers that banks
disdained. The common bond requirement, an existing characteristic of state credit unions, was designed, in
combination with the restriction that permitted credit unions to loan only to members, to ensure that credit unions
would effectively meet members' borrowing needs. It would seem, therefore, that Congress assumed implicitly that
a common bond amongst members would ensure both that those making lending decisions would know more about
applicants and that borrowers would be more reluctant to default. That is surely why it was thought that credit
unions, unlike banks, could "loan on character." The common bond was seen as the cement that united credit
union members in a cooperative venture, and was, therefore, thought important to credit unions' continued success.
To be sure, as time passed--as credit unions flourished and competition among consumer lending institutions
intensified--bankers began to see the common bond requirement as a desirable limitation on credit union expansion.
To that end, in the 1970s bankers, according to appellants, became active in lobbying Congress to urge the
maintenance of the common bond requirement. But that fact, assuming it is true, hardly serves to illuminate the
intent of the Congress that first enacted the common bond requirement in 1934. And we find no indication that
Congress was, at that earlier time, concerned about the competitive position of banks.
There remains, however, the more subtle question, whether banks can be thought suitable challengers to enforce
a requirement designed to benefit the members-particularly potential borrowers--of credit unions. Appellants rely
on the Supreme Court's reasoning in ICI and Clarke, and it seems to us the parallels between those cases and the
present one are striking. In ICI the securities industry challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that
would have permitted banks to slip the Glass-Steagall leash and enter what was considered a part of the securities
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business. As the Supreme Court later explained in Clarke, the Glass-Steagall Act, which limited the securities
underwriting and investment activities of banks, was designed to protect bank depositors from risky bank
activities--not to insulate investment bankers, or indeed, any noncommercial bankers, from competition.
Nevertheless, because the investment bankers pursued interests congruent with those of the intended beneficiaries,
they were permitted to sue in ICI to enforce Glass-Steagall's restrictions on banks.
A plaintiff who has a competitive interest in confining a regulated industry within certain congressionally
imposed limitations may sue to prevent the alleged loosening of those restrictions, even if the plaintiffs interest is
not precisely the one that Congress sought to protect. The limitations may be restrictions on entry--geographic or
product line--or they might be, as in our case, limitations on growth, which are akin to entry restrictions. Like
more classic entry restrictions, the common bond requirement, by limiting a credit union's customer base,
effectively prevents the credit union from offering its services and competing in a broader market.
Appellees, sidestepping the entry-restriction cases, rely primarily on our refinement of prudential standing
analysis in HWTC IV. In that case, an organization of companies that treated hazardous waste and marketed
products derived from processed waste sued to force the EPA to adopt stricter environmental regulations on other
companies so as to create a greater market for their own services and products. We held that HWTC's interests
were not sufficiently congruent with those of the intended beneficiaries of the statute to make HWTC a suitable
challenger.. The treatment firms' interest was in selling more services and equipment to the regulated companies,
and therefore the firms would seek regulations that would increase demand for their product regardless of the
effects on the statute's intended beneficiaries. We concluded that to have standing under the statute, HWTC would
have to have shown a systematic alignment of interests with the statute's beneficiaries.
Our decision did not rest on a conclusion that the economic interests of the treatment firms were somehow less
deserving than the environmental interests the statute was designed to foster; nor was it based on a view that the
firms' economic incentives were inherently less worthy than the economic objectives of the securities industry
plaintiffs in ICI and Clarke. On the contrary, the economic motivations could be thought analogous. If the
watchword of the treatment firms in HWTC IV was "treatment is good and more treatment is better," it might be
said that the watchword of all competitors with regard to their potential rivals must be "regulation is good and
more restrictive regulation is better." And one cannot base standing on one's mere status as an economic
beneficiary of government regulation of others.
The distinction between HWTC IV on the one hand and ICI and Clarke on the other must be that in ICI and
Clarke the potentially limitless incentives of competitors were channeled by the terms of the statute into suits of
a limited nature brought to enforce the statutory demarcation dividing the banking and securities industries. The
interests the securities industry plaintiffs sought to protect were thus less open-ended and more confined than were
the economic interests pursued in HWTC IV, and as a result there was a reduced danger of distorting congressional
purpose.
The securities industry plaintiffs in ICI and Clarke were not seeking to impose new regulations on banks in
areas unrelated to an existing, specific statutory norm simply to provide a demand for their services or to weaken
banks as competitors. We certainly would not accept as a suitable plaintiff a party who had only a general
economic interest in harming a competitor and who, accordingly, sought to impose some new, more onerous
regulation upon that competitor. But, when the plaintiff seeks to enforce a statutory restriction on his
competitor-a restriction the plaintiff enjoys as well as the statutory beneficiaries--there is a good deal less risk that
recognizing the plaintiffs standing will lead to a misdirection of a statutory scheme.
Our reasoning in HWTC suggests that our reaction might be different if the banks appeared before us, not
asking to patrol the common bond picket line, but seeking a new regulation that would squeeze the credit unions
into a smaller market or even eliminate them from the market altogether. It is unnecessary, however, to extend
our holding into a definitive answer to appellants' hypotheticals; we concede that the general issue is devilishly
complex. We feel confident, however, that this case is a good deal closer to the paradigm of ICI and Clarke than
it is to HWTC, and, therefore, we hold that appellants have standing. The judgment of the district court is reversed
and the case remanded.
WALD, Circuit Judge, concurring: [OMITTED]
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellants,
V.
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION, Appellee,
AT&T Family Credit Union and Credit Union National Association, Appellees.
90 F.3d 525.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided July 30, 1996.
GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. s 1759, provides that "Federal credit union
membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within
a well- defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." The question presented in this appeal is whether the
members of an occupational FCU must all share a single "common bond of occupation" or, as the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA) contends, membership may be drawn from multiple unrelated groups, each with
its own common bond. The district court held that the NCUA reasonably interpreted that Act to allow members
of unrelated groups to join the same credit union, provided only that a common bond exists among the members
of each constituent group. Because the Congress resolved this very issue the other way, we reverse the district court
and disapprove the decision of the NCUA under step one of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.
I. Background
The plaintiffs-appellants are the American Bankers Association and several North Carolina banks, including
First National Bank and Trust Company (FNBT). They brought this suit against the NCUA, the federal regulatory
agency that administers the FCUA, seeking to overturn that agency's approval of certain applications filed by
AT&T Family Federal Credit Union (ATTF) to expand its field of membership to include employees of various
small businesses in North Carolina and Virginia that are unaffiliated with the credit union's existing membership
base. ATTF and the Credit Union National Association, a trade association, have intervened in support of the
agency. Under the FCUA, an FCU is, like a mutual association or a cooperative, owned and controlled by its
members; it can make loans to and take deposits from (formally, sell shares to) only its own members and other
credit unions. The Congress expected that the Act, by "guaranteeing democratic self-government[,] would infuse
the credit union with a spirit of cooperative self-help and ensure that the credit union would remain responsive to
its members' needs."
The "common bond" provision has been part of the FCUA since the statute was enacted in 1934. The Congress
did not fully explicate the purpose or limits of that provision, but "assumed implicitly that a common bond amongst
members would ensure both that those making lending decisions would know more about applicants and that
borrowers would be more reluctant to default.... The common bond was seen as the cement that united credit union
members in a cooperative venture."
From 1934 until 1982 the NCUA interpreted the common bond requirement to mean that the members of each
occupational FCU-we put aside the associational alternative, which plays no role in this case--must be drawn from
a single occupational group, defined to mean the employees of a single employer. In 1982, however, the NCUA
altered its interpretation of nearly 50-years' standing to allow an FCU to comprise not just one but "multiple
occupational groups." Each such group need only be within a "well-defined area,", by which the NCUA means an
area served by an actual or planned office (of which there may be any number) of the credit union.
The 1982 change of interpretation was intended to enable each FCU to realize economies of scale and to
facilitate occupational diversification within the ranks of its membership. The new policy also made it possible for
the employees of a company with fewer than 500 employees, the minimum for forming a new FCU, to join an
existing FCU. The NCUA reiterated its new position through policy statements issued in 1989, when ATTF filed
the first of the applications that FNBT here challenges, and most recently in 1994. The agency explained in 1989
that "[a] select group of persons seeking credit union service from an occupational, associational or multiple group
Federal credit union must have its own common bond," but "[t]he group's common bond need not be similar to the
common bond(s) of the existing Federal credit union."
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FNBTs complaint is at bottom that Interpretive Ruling 89-1 violates the FCUA by allowing groups lacking any
common bond among them to join together in a credit union, ATTF in particular. Originally chartered in 1952
as the Radio Shops Federal Credit Union, the common bond of ATTF members was that they were "[elmployees
of the Radio Shops of Western Electric Company, Inc., who work in Winston-Salem, Greensboro, and Burlington,
North Carolina; employees of this credit union; members of their immediate families; and organizations of such
persons." ATIF has since grown to have 112,000 members in more than 150 disparate occupational groups spread
across all 50 states, including the employees of a major tobacco company, an auto supply chain, and a television
station. Its potential membership exceeds 357,000. As of January 1994 ATTF had more than 63,000 loans
outstanding, totaling over $268 million. FNBT maintains that by allowing ATTF to accept members from among
the employees of any number of employers, the NCUA has in effect opened the membership to anyone with a job.
Initially, the district court dismissed this case for lack of standing. On appeal, however, we reversed on the
ground that the banks are "what we have termed suitable challengers, that is ... their interests are sufficiently
congruent with those of the intended beneficiaries that [they] are not more likely to frustrate than to further the
statutory objectives." We remanded for a determination on the merits, as to which the district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. . The district court held that the common bond requirement is
ambiguous and that the NCUA's interpretation of the provision to mean that "a credit union may have several
groups, each with its own common bond" is reasonable.
II. Analysis
We review an agency's interpretation of a statute entrusted to its administration under the familiar rubric of the
Chevron case: If the Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue," the court "must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"; if, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous on the question
at issue, then the court will defer to the agency's interpretation if it is permissible in light of the structure and
purpose of the statute. In resolving the threshold question whether congressional intent is sufficiently clear for
us to review the case under step one of Chevron, "we are not required to grant any particular deference to the
agency's parsing of statutory language or its interpretation of legislative history." FNBT argues this case under
step one of Chevron only. According to FNBT, the intent of the Congress is clearly discernible from the statutory
text and the purpose of the statute. We agree.
A. Section 109 by Its Terms
To repeat, s 109 provides in relevant part that "Federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups
having a common bond of occupation ... or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural
district" FNBT contends, first, that the article "a" in the phrase "groups having a common bond" means that all
members of an FCU must be united by a single occupation. The NCUA counters that the plural noun "groups" in
the same phrase indicates that there may be multiple groups in an FCU, so that the statute makes sense only if it
is understood to contemplate multiple bonds, each uniting a single group even if the same bond does not unite all
groups.
Neither syntactical argument is convincing. The article "a" could as easily mean one bond for each group as
one bond for all groups in an FCU, and the plural noun "groups" could refer not to multiple groups in a single FCU
but to each of the groups that forms a credit union under the FCUA. Indeed, focusing upon "groups" begs the
question whether they must share a common bond; it is, after all, a common bond that makes a group of what
would otherwise be a collection of individuals without a theme.
Nonetheless, use of the word "groups" in s 109 does support FNBT's interpretation and not the NCUA's. As
a leading dictionary of the time put it, a group is an 'assemblage ... having some resemblance or common
characteristic." By this definition, a common bond is implicit in the term "group." Therefore, if two or more
"occupational groups" can be said to have a common bond, it must be because there is a characteristic common to
each and every member of the several groups.
Or, viewing the question another way, the term "common bond" would be surplusage if it applied only to the
members of each constituent group and not across all groups of members in an FCU. Instead of limiting
membership to "groups having a common bond of occupation," the Congress could, without affecting the meaning
of the statute, have simply said "occupational groups."
FNBTs second textual argument is that the term "groups" in the two parallel provisions of s 109--permitting
credit unions composed either of (1) "groups having a common bond of occupation" among all the members or of
(2) "groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district"--must be interpreted in a consistent
way. If the so-called community provision were construed in a manner consistent with the NCUA's revised
interpretation of the occupational provision, then a single FCU could include residents of any number of
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"well-defined neighborhood[s], communit[ies], or rural district[s]" around the country. Yet this expansive
construction has never been advocated by the NCUA; on the contrary, the NCUA regulation implementing the
community provision expressly requires that all FCU members live, worship, or work in "a single, geographically
well-defined area."
The NCUA answers this argument by noting that the two grammatically parallel provisions of s 109 do not,
upon close inspection, use the same terms: "the limitation of geographic groups to those 'within' a defined area,"
we are told, "clearly supports the NCUA's conclusion that membership in a community credit union may not consist
of groups from widely dispersed locales." But the NCUA's point is not at all responsive to FNBT's argument. The
question is how "groups" can be given a different meaning in the two parallel phrases: "groups having a common
bond of occupation" and "groups within a well-defined [area]." The statute does not allow multiple groups, each
within a different neighborhood, to form a single community FCU. Nor therefore can the statute consistently allow
multiple groups, each drawn from a different occupation (which the NCUA equates with a different employer), to
form an occupational FCU.
In sum, the FCUA requires by its terms that all members of a credit union share a single common bond. Our
example of two companies under joint ownership meets that statutory requirement--and does so without including
unrelated groups, which would drain the phrase "common bond" of all meaning. The NCUA may identify and
approve other types of common bonds, subject only to the rule of reason embedded in Chevron step two. If the
statute is to be read as it is written, however, the one thing that the agency may not do is permit unrelated groups
to form a single FCU unless a common bond unites all of the members.
B. The Purpose of s 109
First let us dispatch the suggestion . . that the Congress intended the common bond provision to foreclose
unfair competition between credit unions, which are tax exempt, and banks, which are not. According to the
Alliance, a principal purpose of the common bond is to constrict the market that credit unions can serve, thereby
limiting the threat that they pose to banks. We squarely rejected this argument on the first appeal of this case:
"Congress did not, in 1934, intend to shield banks from competition from credit unions. Indeed, the very notion
seems anomalous, because Congress' general purpose was to encourage the proliferation of credit unions, which
were expected to provide service to those would-be customers that banks disdained."
FNBT itself makes a more persuasive argument based upon the purpose of the common bond requirement. The
Congress intended that each FCU be a cohesive association in which the members are known by the officers and
by each other in order to "ensure both that those making lending decisions would know more about applicants and
that borrowers would be more reluctant to default. That is surely why it was thought that credit unions, unlike
banks, could 'loan on character.' " There can be little doubt that growth on the scale achieved by ATTF is
inconsistent with that purpose.
The NCUA points out that under its regulations a new group is not permitted to join an existing FCU unless
the members are within an area that can reasonably be served from an existing or proposed office of the credit
union. This administrative policy might initially seem to blunt FNBT's claim that under the NCUA's current
interpretation of the common bond requirement an FCU could accept anyone as a member simply because he or
she is employed. Upon closer inspection, however, the agency's point is a makeweight. For whatever restraining
force the common bond requirement retained after NCUA changed its interpretation of the Act in 1982, it did not
impede ATTF's dramatic expansion.
In short, reading s 109 as the 73d Congress wrote it, i.e., to require that a single common bond be shared among
all members of an occupational credit union, furthers the overriding purpose of the FCUA--to "unite[ I credit union
members in a cooperative venture." The NCUA's reading, which permits multiple unrelated groups to form an
occupational FCU, frustrates that purpose. If this conception of an FCU seems dated in the world of ATMs and
nearly nationwide financial institutions of a scale surely unimaginable in 1934, then the case for updating the
FCUA must be addressed to the Congress.
C. The Legislative History of s 109
Finally, we look to the legislative history of the FCUA only to determine whether it so convincingly contradicts
our interpretation of the text, reinforced by our understanding of the purpose of the statute, as to require that we
rethink the matter.
FNBT emphasizes the Report of the Senate Comiuttee on Banking and Currency, which defines a credit union,in part, as "a cooperative society ... limited in each case to the members of a specific group with a common bond
of occupation or association." The NCUA and AT'F extract their version of the legislative history from the Report
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of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, which paraphrases s 109 as providing that "Imlembership in
Federal credit unions is limited to groups having common bonds of occupation or association."
The district court itself assigned some weight to "the fact that Congress has not objected to ... the 1982
expansion" of the common bond requirement. In a Chevron step two analysis, where the issue is whether the
agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable, congressional inaction might be minimally enlightening. This
is a Chevron step one analysis, however, the silence of a later Congress says nothing about the intent of the earlier
Congress that spoke directly to the question here at issue.
III. Conclusion
Based upon the text and the purpose of the FCUA, we conclude under Chevron step one that all the members
of an FCU must share a common bond. If there are multiple occupational groups within a single credit union, then
it is not sufficient that the members of each different group have a bond common to that group only.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court. The case is remanded to that court for the entry of
declaratory and injunctive relief, consistent with the foregoing opinion, concerning the NCUA's 1989 and 1990
approvals of certain applications filed by ATTF. So ordered.
310
96-1400 CALIFORNIA V. DEEP SEA RESEARCH INC.
Ruling below (Deep Sea Research Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, CA 9, 89 F.3d 680):
Intent of Abandoned Shipwreck Act is to transfer title to states only for shipwrecks that
meet ASA's requirements, namely, that shipwreck be abandoned, be located on submerged
lands of state, and be either embedded in sea floor or determined eligible for listing in National
Register of Historic Places; accordingly, shipwrecks that do not meet requirements of ASA
continue to be subject to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts, and state law, to
extent it gives state title to shipwrecks that do not meet ASA requirements, is preempted;
ASA does not vest title to wrecks that satisfy its requirements directly in state but rather
provides that federal government may assert title to such wrecks and transfer title to state;
accordingly, federal court may adjudicate whether wreck meets ASA requirements without
implicating Eleventh Amendment and trial court did not err in requiring state to establish by
preponderance of evidence that it had colorable claim to shipwreck that would entitle it to
immunity; trial court did not err in holding that wrecked vessel was not abandoned; insurance
companies took title to portions of wreck by right of subrogation and under ASA regulations
when they paid claims on vessel, evidence included agreements reached by salvager with two
insurance companies assigning title to wreck to salvager, and because technology required
to salvage vessel has been developed only recently, failure of claimants to come forward does
not give rise to inference that they had abandoned title to vessel or personal property on
board.
Questions presented: (1) In in rem admiralty action seeking title or salvage rights to
shipwreck lying on submerged land of state, is state's successful invocation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity dependent upon whether state can first prove to district court by
preponderance of evidence that it owns shipwreck? (2) Does ASA "preempt" state title to
shipwrecks that are not within coverage of act? (3) Should historic shipwreck be considered
not "abandoned," and thus not subject to protections of ASA, solely because insurance
company paid claim on portion of ship's cargo?
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HIGH COURT TO DECIDE RIGHTS TO SHIPWRECK
Anchorage Daily News
Tuesday, June 10, 1997
Richard Carelli The Associated Press
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to use the
case of a California Gold Rush-era ship that sank 132
years ago to decide how courts --including those in
Alaska -- should handle disputes between states and
treasure hunters.
The court, granting an appeal by California
officials, said it will review rulings that named Deep
Sea Research Inc. -- and not the state -- sole owner of
the sunken ship with exclusive salvage rights.
A decision is expected in 1998.
California's appeal was supported in
friend-of-the-court briefs submitted by 15 other states
and a coalition of groups dedicated to protecting
historic shipwrecks.
The brief submitted in behalf of the 15 states told
the justices that the lower court rulings in the
California case "made it infinitely more difficult for
the states to manage historic, abandoned vessels on
their property."
Those states are Alaska, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New York,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.
The other friend-of-the-court brief said a 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in the California case
"will return the law of historic shipwrecks to an era of
confusion and unnecessary litigation, jeopardizing the
ability of the states to protect these valuable historic
resources." The justices were told their ruling could
affect more than 5,000 such shipwrecks.
The Brother Jonathan, a 220-foot-long,
wooden-hulled paddle steamer, sank in 1865 while en
route to the Puget Sound from San Francisco. Most of
its 250 passengers and crew members drowned. Deep
Sea Research, a California-based company, searched
for the Brother Jonathan for about 20 years before
discovering it below 250 feet of water about 41/2 miles
off of Crescent City, Calif.
Deep Sea Research located the two insurance
companies that paid the lion's share of the wreck's
claims and purchased title to the ship and its contents
from them.
Both companies stated in the contracts that they
had never abandoned their title to the shipwreck.
When Deep Sea Research sought exclusive salvage
rights in federal court, California officials intervened
and sought to have the case dismissed.
The state claimed ownership and invoked its 11th
Amendment immunity from being sued in federal
court without its permission.
After both sides stipulated that the shipwreck is
located on state submerged land, a federal trial judge
rejected the state's attempt to have the case dismissed.
The judge ruled that the state had failed to prove
that the wreck was abandoned, a requirement under a
1987 federal law called the Abandoned Shipwreck Act.
Copyright 1997. The Associated Press.
All Rights Reserved
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COURT IS ASKED TO THWART TREASURE HUNTERS
The Sacramento Bee
Monday, March 10, 1997
Patrick Hoge Bee Staff Writer
Seeking to block private treasure hunters from
salvaging the deadliest shipwreck in California history,
the State Lands Commission has petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for help in getting the vessel declared
public property.
The Brother Jonathan, a wooden, side-wheeled
steamship that sank in 1865 off the coast of Del Norte
County, is a cultural resource that should not be
touched without proper archaeological supervision,
said Peter Pelkofer, the commission's senior counsel.
"Money's not the issue," said Pelkofer, who hopes
to get a response from the Supreme Court this spring
and perhaps a hearing next fall.
"We're not in there competing for the loot. We're in
there for the ship. The whole idea is that it will become
part of the historic culture of the people of the state of
California," he said.
Two lower federal courts have found that the state
has no say. Under maritime law, a San Diego company
called Deep Sea Research Inc. was given sole rights in
1995 to salvage the ship -- which some believe carried
large amounts of gold.
Fletcher Alford, a San Francisco attorney
representing Deep Sea Research, says the company
intends to preserve all artifacts.
"The primary disagreements between us and the
state are the monetary issues," said Alford. "The state
wants 50 percent off the top, without taking any of the
risk."
Pelkofer said no specific financial arrangements
have been discussed.
But Pelkofer, a maritime history buff who
participates in Internet discussions on archaeology,
said he doubts whether much gold was on the 220-foot
ship when it struck a rock during a violent storm and
went down 4 V2 miles off Crescent City.
The ship had left from San Francisco two days
earlier bound for Portland, Ore. Only 16 of the nearly
250 aboard survived.
Deep Sea Research maintains it should not have to
get a state permit because the firm bought out an
insurance company that, in the 19th century, had paid
a claim on some of the sunken cargo, Alford said.
The salvage company has videotaped the largely
intact Brother Jonathan, which was located under 250
feet of water in 1993, and has brought some artifacts to
the surface.
Deep Sea Research has about 100 private investors
and has spent more than $1 million pursuing the
Brother Jonathan, said David Flohr, the company's
treasurer.
Flohr, a retired Navy pilot, called the state's latest
legal salvo "a waste of taxpayers' money.
"The state case, as court documents show, was so
poorly prepared and poorly founded that it is not really
based on factual information," Flohr said.
To date, the State Lands Commission has had little
luck in court, with a federal judge finding that Deep
Sea Research had adequate archaeological preservation
plans, and that the state had no claim to the ship.
The lands commission appealed, but the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling last year.
According to the state's Supreme Court petition,
those decisions erode California's 11th Amendment
protection against being sued in federal court without
the state's consent.
The way Alford sees it, that sort of protection
would give the state sole authority to interpret the
federal Abandoned Shipwrecks Act regarding ships in
state waters.
"That's an argument that I don't think the Supreme
Court is going to find particularly appealing," he said.
Copyright 1997, The Sacramento Bee
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DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
The BROTHER JONATHAN, her Appurtenances, furniture, cargo, etc., Defendant,
and
State of California; State Lands Commission, Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants,
United States of America, Defendant-Intervenor.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
89 F.3d 680
Decided July 17, 1996.
... D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellee Deep Sea Research ("DSR") brought this in rem admiralty action seeking salvage rights and title to
the wreck of the Brother Jonathan, a double paddle wheel steamer that sank in 1865 off the coast of Crescent City,
California. After nineteen years of searching, DSR claims to have discovered the Brother Jonathan and has
stipulated for the purposes of these proceedings that it is located upon submerged lands of the State of California.
The State of California intervened for the limited purpose of asserting that it has a colorable claim of ownership
to the wreck and that as a result, the district court is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from adjudicating DSR's
claim.
The State argues that it has a colorable claim to ownership under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
("ASA"), the Submerged Lands Act ("SLA") and Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313. After an evidentiary hearing, the
district court held that the State had failed to establish a colorable claim to ownership and rejected its motion to
dismiss the claim. The State appeals.
The United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the ASA. The Columbus-America Discovery
Group has filed an amicus curiae brief in which it argues that this circuit should not adopt the rule of the Fourth
Circuit, which requires an express renunciation of ownership in order to establish abandonment.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DSR filed this in rem admiralty action in November, 1991, seeking to perfect its title to and salvage rights in
the wreck of the Brother Jonathan. At the initiative of DSR, the case was dismissed without prejudice in June 1992,
and reopened in February 1994, a few months after DSR actually discovered the wreck. DSR had been searching
for the wreck of the Brother Jonathan for almost twenty years. Until DSR discovered the wreck, neither the State
nor anyone else knew its location, and the State had not made any attempt to locate the wreck. DSR asserts title
to the wreck as the assignee of the subrogation rights of two insurance companies that paid claims on the cargo of
the Brother Jonathan. However, according to newspaper accounts published at the time of the disaster, about two
thirds of the cargo on board was uninsured. Neither is there any evidence that the ship itself was insured.
The State intervened and moved to dismiss, arguing that the wreck belonged to the State under both the ASA
and Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313. It asserted that even though the State was not named in the complaint, the suit was,
in reality, against the State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The State also argued that because
the wreck met the requirements of the ASA, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over DSR's claim.
Under the ASA, the federal government asserts title to certain historic wrecks and transfers it to the states on
whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. A shipwreck meets the requirements of the ASA if it is 1)
abandoned; 2) located on a state's submerged lands; and 3) either embedded in the sea floor or determined eligible
for listing in the National Register of Historic Places ("National Register").
In cases involving wrecks that fall under the ASA, the traditional admiralty law of salvage and finds does not
apply. Instead, these wrecks are governed by the provisions of the ASA. As a result, the fate of these vessels may
be determined in state or federal court However, the statute makes clear that the "laws of the United States relating
to shipwrecks" shall continue to apply to all other wrecks. Thus, the federal courts retain exclusive admiralty
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jurisdiction over cases involving wrecks that do not meet the requirements of the ASA.
Section 6313 of the California Public Resources Code is broader than the ASA, because under that provision
California asserts title to all abandoned shipwrecks on state-owned submerged lands. Under the SLA, the state
owns all submerged lands within three miles of the mean high tide.
The district court held two evidentiary hearings on the State's motion to dismiss. The first hearing was devoted
to the issue of whether the Brother Jonathan was located on state submerged lands. DSR subsequently stipulated
that it was. At the second hearing, the parties addressed the issues of abandonment, embeddedness and the
historical significance of the wreck.
The district court denied the State's motion to dismiss, holding that the State had not established a colorable
claim to the wreck of the Brother Jonathan under the ASA. The court reasoned, based on ITSI TV Productions,
Inc. v. Agricultural Ass'ns, that a party asserting sovereign immunity must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the privilege applies. The court determined that the State did not establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the wreck of the Brother Jonathan was abandoned, embedded or eligible for listing in the National
Register. It further held that the ASA preempts Cal.Pub.Res. Code s 6313 to the extent that s 6313 asserts title to
shipwrecks that are beyond the scope of the ASA. Because it held that the ASA did not apply to the Brother
Jonathan, the court did not reach DSR's challenge to the constitutionality of the ASA.
The State appeals, arguing that it need not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the wreck of
the Brother Jonathan meets the requirements of the ASA in order to make a colorable claim of ownership and
qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity. It asserts that under Marx v. Government of Guam, it has
demonstrated all that is necessary to make a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan. It also asserts that the district
court erroneously held that the ASA preempts Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313. Finally, the State challenges the district
court's exclusion of the audio portion of a video tape that suggests that the Brother Jonathan is, in fact, embedded
in the ocean floor.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's determination that the State was required to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that it had a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan in order to qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity is a
legal question, which we review de novo. Twenty-Three Nineteen Creekside, Inc. v. Commissioner. Similarly,
we review de novo the district court's holding that the ASA preempts CaLPub.Res.Code s 6313. We review for clear
error the district court's factual determination that the Brother Jonathan does not meet the requirements of the ASA.
Finally, the district court's exclusion as hearsay of the audio portion of the video tape that may suggest the Brother
Jonathan is embedded is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
ANALYSIS
I. Preemption of Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313 by the ASA
The State challenges the district court's holding that the ASA preempts Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313 insofar as
s 6313 asserts title to shipwrecks that are not covered by the ASA. This provision grants the state title to all
abandoned shipwrecks located on its submerged lands that are more than fifty years old or of special historical
significance. According to the State, the district court erroneously construed s 7 of the ASA as explicitly preempting
the California provision. Section 7 provides that the Act 'shall not change the laws of the United States relating
to shipwrecks other than those to which this chapter applies." The State argues that because state law is
incorporated into federal maritime law, s 7 of the ASA does not preempt Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313. The State's
argument is incorrect.
Federal law can preempt a state statute either by explicit language in the statute or when the intent of Congress
to preempt state action is "implicit from a pervasive scheme of federal regulation that leaves no room for state and
local supplementation." Federal law also may preempt state law when there is an actual conflict between state and
federal law. Section 7 of the ASA makes clear that Congress intended to transfer title to the states only for
shipwrecks that meet the requirements of the ASA. All other shipwrecks continue to be subject to the exclusive
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, as provided by Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution.
Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313 takes title to shipwrecks that do not meet the requirements of the ASA and which are
therefore within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, the district court correctly held
that s 6313 is preempted to the extent that it gives the State title to shipwrecks that do not meet the requirements
of the ASA.
H. The State's Entitlement to Eleventh Amendment Immunity
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The State argues on appeal that the district court erred in holding that the State did not have a colorable claim
to the Brother Jonathan and therefore was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. First, the State
contends, the district court should not have required it to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it
met the criteria of the ASA in order to make a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan. Rather, it argues, this case
is governed by Marx v. Government of Guam. In that case, the 9th Circuit held that the government of Guam had
made a colorable claim to an abandoned shipwreck by demonstrating that the shipwreck in question was on state
submerged lands and that one of Guam's statutes asserted ownership to shipwrecks located on state submerged
lands. According to the State, in order to make a colorable claim in this case, it need only assert that the Brother
Jonathan is on its submerged lands and that Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313 vests title in the State to abandoned
shipwrecks on its submerged lands.
The State also challenges the district court's holding that the Brother Jonathan was not abandoned or embedded,
arguing that it has a colorable claim to the shipwreck under the ASA as well. In addition to arguing that the State
presented adequate evidence of both abandonment and embeddedness, the State contends that the district court
applied the wrong test with respect to abandonment. The State argues that the district court erroneously required
that abandonment be shown by an affirmative act on the part of the original owner demonstrating intent to renounce
ownership.
A. Requirements for Making a Colorable Claim to the Brother Jonathan
The State argues that the Eleventh Amendment limits the showing required to make a colorable claim to
ownership of an abandoned shipwreck. It reasons that "[i]f a state has to prove the merits of its ownership claim
in order to establish its Eleventh Amendment immunity, then it has no Eleventh Amendment immunity." Thus,
in cases involving a state's assertion of ownership of wrecks on its submerged lands, the State asserts, it is
inappropriate to adopt the rule of ITSI TV, which requires that the State demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that it is entitled to immunity. Rather, citing Marx v. Government of Guam, the State asserts that it
should be required to demonstrate only that the shipwreck is on state submerged lands and that there is a state
statute giving it title to shipwrecks on its submerged lands. The State's argument is without merit.
In Marx v. Government of Guam, Guam claimed two shipwrecks located on its submerged lands and argued
that sovereign immunity precluded the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the wrecks in an in rem admiralty
action. The court expressly did not base its decision on the ASA because that case was initiated prior to that
statute's adoption and the Act specifically exempts such proceedings. Rather, its decision was based on Guam's
Underwater Historic Property Act, which conveyed to Guam broad title and control over property located on its
submerged lands. The court rejected the argument that adoption of the ASA indicated that the previously enacted
Guam statute was invalid, finding that in adopting the ASA Congress "merely wanted to clarify the effect of the
Submerged Lands Act and did not intend to express an opinion about preexisting law." On the basis of the Guam
statute and the Submerged Lands Act, the court found that Guam had a "colorable claim" to the wrecks and
dismissed the case on the basis of Guam's sovereign immunity.
The State of California asserts that the facts in this case are virtually identical to those in Marx v. Government
of Guam because the Brother Jonathan is located on California's submerged lands and Cal.Pub.Res. Code s 6313
asserts title to abandoned shipwrecks on state submerged lands. Thus, it argues, it has made an adequate showing
to establish a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan and this case should be dismissed on the basis of sovereign
immunity.
However, the State's argument fails to take into account the impact of the adoption of the ASA on the
requirements for making a colorable claim to a wreck. In adopting the ASA, Congress preempted state laws whichpurported to take title to all shipwrecks on their submerged lands, at least to the extent that such laws took title to
shipwrecks that did not meet the requirements of the ASA. Thus, while the Government of Guam was able to make
a colorable claim under its broad statute, it follows that a more extensive showing is required in this case, in which
the ASA applies, to make a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan.
Furthermore, a federal court has both the power and duty to determine whether a case falls within its subject
matter jurisdiction. Therefore, it was appropriate for the district court to require the State to present evidence that
the ASA applied to the Brother Jonathan, i.e., that it was abandoned and either embedded or eligible for listing inthe National Register, before dismissing the case. Otherwise, as DSR points out, the State could receive immunity
simply by asserting that it was entitled to it. For a federal court to renounce jurisdiction over an admiralty case onthe basis of a mere assertion of entitlement to immunity on the part of the State is inconsistent with the court's dutyto assess whether it has jurisdiction.
The State also argues that the district court erroneously relied on ITSI TV in imposing on the State the burden
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of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the ASA applies to the Brother Jonathan. In ITSI TV, this court
addressed the question, "who bears the burden of persuasion when a putative state entity claims immunity from suit
in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment?" There, a television production company sued California State
Fair and Exposition and various district agricultural associations for copyright infringement. The defendants moved
to dismiss on the ground that they were arms of the State and therefore were immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. They further argued that because Eleventh Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional bar, the burden
is on the plaintiffs to establish that the defendants are not entitled to such immunity.
The court rejected the defendants' argument, holding instead that "Eleventh Amendment immunity, whatever
its jurisdictional attributes, should be treated as an affirmative defense," which "must be proved by the party that
asserts it and would benefit from its acceptance." In reaching this conclusion, the court drew on the law governing
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA"), and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Both acts place the
burden on the defendant to prove that it is entitled to immunity, and the former explicitly requires that the
defendant demonstrate its entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. The court in ITSI TV also
points out that Eleventh Amendment immunity is most likely to be the subject of dispute when a "complex
institutional arrangement makes it unclear whether a given entity ought to be treated as an arm of the State."
Because the details of these institutional arrangements are "peculiarly within the knowledge of the party claiming
immunity," considerations of fairness support placing the burden of proof on the party claiming to be a state entity.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The State argues that this case is distinguishable from ITSI TV because it does not concern the defendant's
status as a state entity. Rather, to determine whether or not the State was entitled to immunity, the district court
in this case evaluated the strength of the State's claim to title of the Brother Jonathan under the ASA and
Cal.Pub.Res.Code s 6313. As a result, the district court required the State to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the shipwreck was abandoned and that it was embedded in the ocean floor or eligible for listing in
the National Register. The State argues that facts relating to these questions, in contrast to the one at issue in ITSI,
are not "peculiarly within the knowledge of the party claiming immunity," but instead, within the knowledge of
DSR Therefore, the State argues, the burden should be on DSR rather than the State to demonstrate that the State
does not have a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan.
While the State is correct that the factual question in ITSI TV differs from the one at issue in this case, it does
not follow that the burden should be on the plaintiff to establish that the State is immune under the Eleventh
Amendment. In ITSI TV, the court draws analogies to both the FSIA and the FTCA. In doing so, it makes no
distinction between cases involving the defendant's status as an agent of the State and cases in which a party's
entitlement to immunity turns on other issues. Further, the State of California cites no authority for the proposition
that such a distinction should be made. We find that, according to the reasoning of the court in ITSI TV, the party
asserting immunity has the burden to establish that it is entitled to immunity even if the determination of that issue
touches the merits of the claim.
Finally, in addressing the questions of abandonment, embeddedness, and historical significance of the wreck
under the ASA, a federal court does not adjudicate the state's rights. The ASA does not vest title to wrecks that
satisfy its requirements directly in the state. Rather, it provides that the federal government may assert title to such
wrecks. Only after the federal government takes title to the abandoned shipwreck may title then be transferred to
the state. Thus, a federal court may adjudicate the question of whether a wreck meets the requirements of the ASA
without implicating the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in requiring
the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
B. Validity of District Court's Factual Determination that the Brother Jonathan Was Not Abandoned
The State challenges the district court's holding that the Brother Jonathan is abandoned. It argues that the
district court erroneously required the State to demonstrate affirmative intent on the part of the owner to abandon.
Instead, the State asserts, the district court should have found that the State made a colorable claim to
abandonment because the original owner of the ship is long gone and the wreck has lain undisturbed on the bottom
of the ocean for 130 years. Further, the State argues, even if the insurers of the Brother Jonathan did not abandon
title, at least a portion of the wreck is abandoned because only part of the cargo was insured and the vessel itself
was not insured.
1. Test for abandonment
The ASA does not define the term "abandonment." Thus, Congress presumably intended that courts apply the
definition of abandonment that has evolved under maritime law. Traditionally, maritime law has found
abandonment when title to a vessel has been affirmatively renounced, or when circumstances give rise to an
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inference that the vessel has been abandoned; courts have found abandonment, for instance, when a vessel is "so
long lost that time can be presumed to have eroded any realistic claim of original title."
The Fourth Circuit in Columbus-America reversed the district court's finding that even though a number of
insurance companies had paid claims on a wreck in 1857, the insurance companies had abandoned their title to
the wreck. The district court inferred abandonment by the insurance companies on the basis of its finding that the
insurance companies had made no efforts to find the wreck and had destroyed any documentation they once had
concerning the case. In holding that abandonment could only be found on the basis of an express renunciation of
ownership, the Fourth Circuit introduced a significant modification into maritime law. The State of California
argues that the district court erred by adopting the Fourth Circuit's rule in this case, rather than relying on the
traditional approach to abandonment which allows abandonment to be inferred on the basis of circumstantial
evidence.
Although the district court in this case cites the Fourth Circuit's decision in Columbus-America, its holding that
the Brother Jonathan is not abandoned rests on the traditional rule that a wreck is not abandoned unless either 1)
title is affirmatively renounced or 2) abandonment can be inferred from the lapse of time or failure to pursue
salvage efforts on the part of the owners. Thus, the State's argument that the district court applied the wrong test
lacks merit.
Further, the district court's failure to infer abandonment from the evidence presented by the State was not clearly
erroneous. DSR presented a newspaper article dating from the time of the wreck listing a number of insurance
companies that insured the cargo of the Brother Jonathan. These insurance companies took title to at least part of
the wreck by right of subrogation and under the ASA regulations when they paid claims on the Brother Jonathan.
DSR also presented evidence of agreements it reached with two of the insurance companies assigning title to the
wreck to DSR Finally, DSR presented undisputed evidence that the technology required to salvage the Brother
Jonathan has been developed only in the last few years, so that successful salvage efforts would have been
impossible until very recently. When the technology to conduct salvage operations has been developed recently,
failure on the part of an owner to attempt to salvage the wreck does not give rise to an inference that the owner has
abandoned title to the vessel.
In response, the State presented a single witness on the issue of abandonment, who had conducted only
twenty-two hours of research in the week before the hearing and did not know whether the insurance companies
who paid claims on the Brother Jonathan had conducted any salvage efforts. Thus, the State presented the district
court with no evidence that the insurance companies intended to abandon the wreck. The district court did not
clearly err in finding that the insurance companies did not abandon title.
2. Partial abandonment
The State argues, however, that even if the insurance companies did not abandon title to the Brother Jonathan,
they held title to only the part of the cargo for which they paid claims. Thus, the State asserts, the portion of the
wreck that was uninsured should be considered abandoned, as there is no one before the court claiming ownership
of that part of the wreck. In support of its argument, the State points to the ASA Guidelines, which specify that
title passes to an insurer when the insurer has paid the full value of the vessel to the owner. The district court
responded by noting that it is "premature for the court to find that any individual items of cargo or personal
property have been abandoned," pointing out that when the discovery of the wreck gains publicity, additional
claimants are likely to come forward. The court further held that "[tihe State's assertion that any abandoned
personal property and uninsured cargo automatically becomes the property of the State is incorrect."
The district court, thus, did not address the issue of whether, under the ASA, when claims were paid on only
a fraction of a ship's cargo, an inference of abandonment arises with respect to the uninsured vessel and remaining
cargo. This is a question of first impression.
The State would have us divide the wreck into the portion on which claims were paid (which would not be
considered abandoned) and the portion that was uninsured (which would be considered abandoned). If we were
to adopt this approach, we would have to dismiss the action in federal court with respect to he abandoned part of
the wreck and retain jurisdiction over the part on which insurance claims were paid.
We decline to divide the wreck of the Brother Jonathan into abandoned and unabandoned portions for thepurposes of the ASA for two reasons. First, if we were to find that the vessel had been partially abandoned, both
the federal court and the state court would be adjudicating the fate of the Brother Jonathan. It is unlikely thatCongress intended such a confusing and inefficient approach in adopting the ASA.
Second, such an approach is inconsistent with the general rule in maritime law of treating wrecks as a legally
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unified res. In fact, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Columbus-America appears to be the only admiralty case in
which a wreck has not been treated as a unified whole. There, the court held that a number of insurance companies
retained title to parts of the wreck and remanded to the district court for a determination of how the wreck would
be apportioned among them.
Having concluded that the Brother Jonathan should be treated as a unified res, the question remains, should the
wreck be considered abandoned (because the vessel and much of its cargo were not insured) or should the vessel
be considered not to have been abandoned (because part of the cargo was insured)? Because the law is reluctant
to find abandonment and because a finding of partial abandonment would deprive those holding title to the
unabandoned portion of the wreck access to the federal forum, we hold that the Brother Jonathan was not
abandoned. We reserve the question of whether there is some point at which the portion of the wreck that is
insured becomes so negligible that the wreck might be considered abandoned for the purposes of the ASA.
IHl. Conclusion
Because we find that the Brother Jonathan was not abandoned and that therefore, it does not fall under the ASA,
we need not reach the State's argument that the district court erred in finding that the Brother Jonathan was not
embedded. Even if the district court erroneously excluded the audio portion of a tape that suggested that the
Brother Jonathan was embedded, the error was harmless. Nor need we address the question of whether we should
take judicial notice of evidence that on October 12, 1995, the Brother Jonathan was determined eligible for
inclusion in the National Register. Finally, because we find that the ASA does not apply, we do not reach the
constitutionality of that statute. We therefore hold that the district court properly denied the state's motion to
dismiss on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We AFFIRM.
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96-643 STEEL CO. V. CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT
Ruling below (CA 7, 90 F.3d 1237, 65 LW 2069, 42 ERC 2057):
Citizen suit provision of 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act permits citizens to seek
penalties against facility for past failure to report toxic chemical releases within statutory deadline, even if facility
cures reporting violations before complaint is filed.
Question presented: In enacting citizen suit provision of EPCRA, 42 USC 11046, did Congress intend to
authorize citizens to seek penalties for violations that were cured before citizen suit was filed, thereby granting
EPCRA citizen suit plaintiffs greater enforcement authority than that granted to other citizen suit plaintiffs under
other federal environmental statutes?
96-1370 FIDELITY FINANCIAL SERVICES INC. V. FINK
Ruling below (CA 8, 102 F.3d 334):
State relation-back law, which permits creditor's lien in automobile that is perfected within 30 days after
purchase to be treated as perfected as of date of purchase, is inapplicable to determination under Section 547(c)(3)
(B) of Bankruptcy Code of whether security interest is actually perfected within 20 days after transfer and thus not
voidable as preferential transfer.
Question presented: Did petitioner's acquisition of purchase money security interest in debtor's automobile
constitute preferential transfer that bankruptcy trustee could avoid pursuant to 11 USC 547?
96-1462 LUNDING V. NEW YORK STATE TAX APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Ruling below (NY CtApp, 89 N.Y.2d 283, 675 N.E.2d 816, 653 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 LW 2452):
Disparity created by New York income tax statute that disallows non-residents full deduction for alimony
payments available to residents is offset by statutes that tax residents on all income but non-residents only on
income earned in state and, thus, does not violate Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Question presented: Did court below err in holding that New York Tax Law Section 631(b) (6), which
discriminates against non-residents of New York who pay New York state income tax by expressly denying them
entirely tax deduction for alimony payments that New York residents are allowed fully to take, does not violate
Privileges and Immunities Clause (Article IV, Section 2) of U.S. Constitution?
96-1470 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS INC. V. L'ANZA RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL INC.
Ruling below (CA 9, 98 F.3d 1109, 65 LW 2293, 40 USPQ2d 1385):
Prohibition of Section 602 (a) of 1976 Copyright Act against importation, without permission of copyright
owner, of U.S. copyrighted goods originally manufactured in United States but acquired outside of United States
is not limited by first-sale doctrine embodied in Section 109 (a), which permits owner of copies "lawfully made
under this title" to "sell or otherwise dispose" of such copies.
Question presented: May U.S. copyright owner, who itself manufactures, first distributes, and sells to foreign
purchaser consumer product with copyrighted label, sue subsequent purchaser of that same product for infringement
of its distribution rights under section 602 (a) of Copyright Act--or does first-sale doctrine contained in section 109
(a) bar lawsuit?
96-1613 U.S. V. ESTATE OF ROMANI
Ruling below (Pa SupCt, 688 A.2d 703, 65 LW 2501):
Section 6323 of Internal Revenue Code, which accords lien priority in federal tax lien matters on first-in-time
basis, limits absolute priority given federal tax claims by federal insolvency statute, 31 USC 3713, and thus holder
of properly entered judgment lien against insolvent decedent's estate has priority over subsequently filed federal
tax lien.
Question presented: Is federal tax claim against insolvent estate to 'be paid first' when judgment lien arose
before notice of tax lien was filed?
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